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The Department of Defense source selection process for
negotiated acquisitions has been plagued by charges of unfair
competition and unsound business practices for years. Begin-
ning with the Harvard Weapons Acquisition project in 1962, con-
tinuing with various Industry studies in the 1960's through the
findings of the Commission on Government Procurement released
in the early 1970's, DOD weapons system acquisition procedures
have come under close scrutiny and increased criticism. Past
statutes have failed to control, and even encouraged such prac-
tices as "technical leveling," "technical transfusion," "auc-
tioning," and "buy-ins." Poorly written Requests for Proposal
have added to the confusion and uncertainty surrounding the
source selection process. In 1976, DOD began a two year test
study of a source selection method called "Four-Step" which had
been adapted from NASA procedures. The four steps in the pro-
cess were (1) submission and evaluation of technical proposals;
(2) submission and evaluation of cost proposals as well as
revisions to technical proposals; (3) the establishment of a
common cut-off date for "best and final" offers and selection of
the apparent winning contractor; and (4) negotiation and award
of a definitive contract. This study looks at current procedures
and the history of continuing problems. The probable effects
of the new Four-Step procedures on those problems are then
analyzed. FinallVj recommendations are presented for changes to
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The solicitation, evaluation, and selection of the sources
to provide major weapons systems and subsystems for the Depart-
ment of Defense are among the most complex and important tasks
in Government acquisition today. A "system" is a composite of
equipment, skills, and techniques capable of performing an
operational role in response to an identified defense need. A
complete system includes various subsystems - all equipment,
related facilities, material, software, services and personnel -
required for its operation and support as a self-sufficient
entity, capable of performing a specific function in its fore-
seeable future environment. A system has a Life-cycle process
from recognition of need through conception, development, pro-
duction, operation, and eventual obsolescence. In general, a
system is considered "major" when it requires a closely inte-
grated technical and management approach to plan the system
requirements; to design, develop, integrate, and test the system;
and to provide the means to closely control the acquisition of
the system. Major systems are usually complex from a techno-
logical and management standpoint, and often present an ap-
preciable degree of technological and business risk. Because of
these characteristics there is usually a relatively high degree
of uncertainty in projected cost, performance, and delivery
schedule for systems. Total system cost, significance, and
urgency are also factors which are considered in identifying

major systems. The actual threshold which specifically defines
a system as "major" for reporting and control purposes is an
anticipated cost of $75 million in research, development, test
and evaluation, or $300 million in production. The practical
differences between managing a $75 million development program
and a $55 million one are those of degree, however, not ones of
"major" or "non-major." Problems preculiar to weapons systems
acquisition are inherent in smaller projects ($2 million to
$74 million) as well as the major projects ($75+). Statutory
rules are the same covering all sizes of acquisitions, but
agency directives change the management and reporting require-
ments for a program defined as "major." For purposes of this
study, "major" shall refer to the narrative description given
above, vice a specific dollar threshold.
There are typically hundreds of contracts written during
the life of given major system. These contracts range from the
initial study contracts, awarded during the conceptual phase
of system development to a number of contractors to: (1) advanced
development efforts directed toward a component or sub-system;
(2) contracts for prototypes of the prime item of the system;
(3) the contract for full-scale development; (4) initial and
subsequent production contracts; and finally, (5) support of
an operational system - contracts for spares and services.
The most critical and important contracting action, how-
ever, is that which occurs in connection with the final selec-
tion of a source at the time of initiation of full-scale develop-
ment. At this phase there are still significant uncertainties
10

and risks involved in the project, not the least of which is
the selection of the best contractor for the job. The success-
ful completion of a major system acquisition depends greatly
upon selection of the best contractor. A poor selection is
i
likely to result in an overall poor acquisition, regardless of
whatever else is done. Equally important is the fact that
Industry places major emphasis on source selection. A partic-
ular company's continued existence as a defense contractor may
hinge on a single act of source selection in the full-scale
development phase for a major project. Many competitions are
fights for survival, a sign of excess capacity in some cases.
(40:3)
The prime objectives of the source selection process are to
(a) select the source whose proposal has the highest degree of
realism and credibility and whose performance is expected to
best meet Government objectives at an affordable cost; (b) as-
sure impartial, equitable, and comprehensive evaluation of
competitors' proposals and related capabilities; and (c) maxi-
mize efficiency and minimize complexity of solicitation, eval-
uation and the selection decision. (96:111. A. 1)
Various factors tend to inhibit the attainment of the above
objectives. A pervasive factor is the Government's dominant
market position in a monopsonis t ic environment (only one buyer
and many sellers). Contributing factors include various pro-
visions in the actual acquisition procedures themselves, as
detailed in the Defense Acquisition Regulations fDAR) , and as
interpreted by the Comptroller General. The principal internal
11

agency regulation written specifically on the subject, DOD Dir-
ective 4105.62 "Selection of Contractual Sources for Major
Defense Systems," tries to counterbalance some of the statutory
and procedural shortcomings, but is still too new (1976) to be
evaluated for effectiveness.
Not surprisingly, communications breakdowns (poorly written
Requests for Proposals - RFP's) also compound the system frus-
tration. Past source selection problems have led to program
overruns, lengthy schedule delivery delays, significant perform-
ance shortfalls, and program cancellations.
B. PURPOSE AND OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY
The purpose of this study is to examine the new Department
of Defense "Four-Step" source selection method in an effort to
determine its potential impact on past source selection system
weaknesses. "Four-Step" is a method of source selection orig-
inally developed by NASA in the late 1960's. Four-Step separates
the submission of cost and technical proposals, restricts dis-
cussions with offerors to "clarifications," and limits actual
contract negotiations to a single contractor. Objectives to
be investigated include how Four-Step will affect:
1. The role of the RFP;
2. Technical leveling (the practice of discussing and cor-
recting deficiencies in an offeror's proposal until it at least
meets the Government's minimum requirements);
3. Technical transfusion (the practice of passing one
offeror's idea to other competing offerors);
12

4. Auctioning (the practice of playing off one contractor
against the others in a predominantly "price competitive"
situation)
;
5. Buy-ins (the practice of a contractor bidding below his
estimated cost for a development project with the assumption
that he will recoup his initial losses with later changes and/
or production work) ; and
6. The selection of the best contractor.
C. BACKGROUND AND FOUNDATIONS
DAR calls for two basic methods of procurement - formal
advertising and negotiations. Formal advertising dates back to
the early 19th century and is still the statutorily preferred
method of Government procurement. Two basic requirements must
be met for formal advertising to be effective. The specifica-
tions/functions of the end product must be well defined, i.e.
all suppliers must be able to bid on the same item; and there
must in fact be sufficient competition to assure the Govern-
ment of a fair price. In the major weapon systems acquisition
environment either one or both of the above requirements are
almost always missing. Research and development does not in-
herently lend itself to formal advertising. DAR recognizes
seventeen situations which would allow negotiations in the place
of formal advertising. The exceptions most utilized for weapons
development and acquisition are #10 "Supplies or services for
which it is impracticable to secure competition by formal ad-
vertising;" #11 "Experimental, developmental, or research work;"
and #14 "Technical or special property . . . which requires a
15

substantial initial investment or an extended period of prep-
aration for manufacture."
The following paragraphs will describe the current source
selection process and its statutory framework of negotiations
procedures. Problems this process has fostered will then be
examined, both by referring to the very rich literature history,
and by relating findings of the researcher's September 1978
San Francisco Bay Area Industry survey.
1 . Source Selection Process
The Department of Defense (DOD) source selection pro-
cess for negotiated procurements, as referred to in this paper,
begins with the pre- solicitation phase, where requirements are
defined; contractor proposals are then solicited, received, and
evaluated. Subsequently, discussions/negotiations are held
between the Government and the offerors, and finally, a success-
ful contractor is chosen based on technical, cost, and other
factors considered.
a. Pre- solicitation Phase
The pre- solicitation phase begins with the receipt
of a requirement by the procurement office and ends with the
issuance of the RFP which seeks to satisfy the requirement.
This phase is extremely important to a successful source selec-
tion. It includes the formulation of the "Statement of Work"
(SOW) which communicates to the offerors what the Government
wants. Evaluation criteria are developed. A Government cost
estimate is prepared. The qualified source list is compiled;
the RFP is written; and the acquisition is then synopsized in
14

the Commerce Business Daily (CBD) ten days before the RF? is
issued.
(1) Statement of Work
The Statement of Work (SOW) must define clearly,
concisely, and completely the requirements of the effort to be
performed. It should be free from ambiguity and redundancy.
The SOW describes the system, equipment, and services to be
provided, i.e., the work to be done, the methods by which the
Government will determine that its requirements have been met,
and technical and management data to be delivered under the
contract, once it is awarded. The SOW will directly affect the
amount and quality of competiton for the project. If speci-
fications are too restrictive, contractors may feel that they
will not have a fair chance for selection (i.e., that specifica-
tions have been "tailored" to another contractor). If specif ica
tions are too vague, contractors may be reluctant to propose
because they do not feel that they really understand what the
Government wants, or what the risks will be. Failure to ade-
quately describe the scope of the work to be done may result in
needless delays in subsequent modifications to the RFP. An un-
clear SOW may also encourage contractors to build in costly con-
tingency allowances to cover the uncertainties. Skill and care
in drafting of the SOW can significantly contribute to reducing
the size of subsequent proposals.
(2) Evaluation Criteria
DAR 3-501(b) Section D requires that the signif-
icant evaluation factors developed for the solicitation be
15

stated in the RFP, in their relative order of importance. The
numerical weights used by the Government agency in the actual
evaluation exercise are not allowed to be published. The
Comptroller General has reaffirmed his support of this policy
several times. (76; 80)
Proposal evaluation factors are usually divided
into the following three categories:
(a) Technical
- understanding of the RFP
- manufacturing capability
- quality assurance program




- management control system
(c) Cost
- reasonableness, appropriateness, realism
(3) Cost Estimate
The cost estimate for the program is generated
by the technical people who are also responsible for the SOW.
They may develop the estimate in-house, or contract for an
"independent cost estimate" (ICE) from a number of sources.
This cost estimate is used as a basis for subsequent evaluation
of the fairness and reasonableness of contractor cost proposals.
A cost estimate is only that, however, an estimate. All cost
parameters are not foreseeable since many contractors propose
solutions to the Government's requirements that are innovative
or unorthodox. The Government is often put in the uncomfortable
position of passing judgement on the reasonableness of the cost
16

estimate of a proposal that it does not fully understand. In




Each procuring activity maintains "bidders
lists" composed of those firms who have signified their interest
in doing business with that particular agency. Each company
submits information concerning the products or services which
it desires to sell and its capabilities and experience to do so.
Bidders lists are maintained for the convenience of the Govern-
ment. Being placed on one does not insure that a company will
be informed of all Government procurements that may be of in-
terest to it. An agency may follow a rotation policy to try to
spread the Government work around for products/services which
have long bidders lists. A company that finds out about a
procurement action, but was not sent an RFP , can request one
from the originating agency and join the competition. Bidders
lists are updated constantly by contacts with Industry market-
ing representatives. When a particular RFP is ready for dis-
tribution to potential sources, the bidders list is used as the
basic reference guide, and RFP's mailed accordingly.
(5) Request for Proposal
The Request for Proposal (RFP) is the official
communication from the Government to Industry asking for pro-
posals for a particular need. The format for the RFP is out-
lined in DAR 3-501. There is not, however, a specified pro-
cedure required for the formulation of information that goes
1"

into the RFP. That varies from agency to agency. Most agencies
have internal directives which give explicit instructions, i.e.,
Air Force RFP Preparation Guide, ASD Pamphlet 70-4. Basically
the RFP is a team effort, with contributions from technical,
operational, legal, logistic support, financial, and acquisition
contracting (previously referred to as "procurement") personnel.
The objective of the RFP is to provide prospective offerors with
adequate information and guidance, presented in a clear and
logical manner, to elicit proposals containing all the informa-
tion needed for objective evaluation and selection of the best
contractor for the project. A Government RFP will contain the
usual composite of terms, certifications, and representations,
followed by solicitation instructions, evaluation factors, des-
criptions/specifications, delivery schedule, quality assurance/
inspection requirements, and the form of the eventual contract,
i.e., cost-type, fixed price. The RFP should also give an
overview and background of system and design requirements. It
should tell Industry what the data requirements will be, what
contractor guidelines must be followed with respect to con-
figuration management, logistics support, reliability, maintain-
ability, life-cycle costing, and others. The RFP must be clear,
complete accurate and consistent with the requirements of the
procurement so that it provides all offerors with the same
understanding of the program. The RFP will usually require
that contractor proposals be presented in two packages - cost
and technical. Often an outline is given for contractors to
follow so that the evaluation process can be simplified later.
18

There also is an unofficial aspect of the pre-
solicitation phase that is very real and has great impact on
later phases of the program: Industry marketing efforts and
supplier contact with Government counterparts. The Government
very seldomly plans in a vacuum. Aggressive Industry field
personnel are in constant contact with Government customers,
keeping up with current programs and those planned for the future
Further, Industry is not always in the position of just respond-
ing to a given Government need. Quite often, marketing people
are successful in creating that need for the Government, and
then filling it with their product.
The RFP, therefore, is not just the result of an
internal Government team effort. Industry is frequently involved
Occasionally, before the final RFP is drawn up, a draft RFP is
circulated to Industry to solicit comments about feasibility
and possible improvements in program concepts. This is not a
requirement and its use varies from agency to agency. The neces-
sity for a draft RFP would also vary depending on the complexity
of the particular program invovled. The presolicitation phase
concludes with the writing of a smooth RFP.
(6) Commerce Business Daily
The Commerce Business Daily (CBD) is the Govern-
ment's official window to the commercial world of contractors.
It is published daily (week days) by the Department of Commerce,
and announces all proposed Government procurements over $10,000
(with a few exceptions), lists recent contract awards, and ad-
vertises for new sources of contractor expertise. Synopses of
19

Government RFP's are supposed to be published in the CBD ten
days before they are distributed to sources on the agency's
bidders list. During this ten day period, other contractors
can request a copy of the RFP and join in the competition. For
purposes of this study then, the last step in the pre-solicit-
ation phase of the source selection process is the publishing of
the RFP synopsis in the CBD.
b. Solicitation Phase
Solicitation begins with the distribution of the
RFP to known "qualified" sources and to any who specifically
request a copy. Usually the period allowed for response is
thirty days, with occasional programs permitting up to sixty or
ninety days. Thirty, however, is the rule, even for large
acquisitions. Sometimes pre-proposal conferences are then
scheduled to allow contractors the opportunity to clarify sec-
tions of the RFP that they may not fully understand. When held,
pre-proposal conferences are usually scheduled for a time short-
ly after the RFP is mailed. They are not required, however, by
DAR.
Occasionally RFP's may be sent out with errors or
omissions which require later amendments to the original docu-
ment. Usually these amendments are made during the solicita-
tion phase as the RFP is scrutinized by many very thorough
contractors. The solicitation phase ends on the date established





c. Proposal Evaluation Phase
This phase begins with the receipt of proposals.
However, the phase does not have a natural ending as evaluations
continue right up to the moment of the award decision. For the
purposes of this paper the evaluation phase will cut off at the
point where the competitive range is determined.
Little statutory attention is paid to this phase
other than to require that proposals be evaluated with regard to
the criteria previously published in the RFP. Government eval-
uation teams are formed to cover each aspect of the cost and
technical proposals. The Proposals are then evaluated incremen-
tally by factors and subfactors. Each factor also had a weight
assigned to it during the pre-solicitation phase (i.e., 25%,
10%, etc.) which was not disclosed in the RFP. These weights
are used at the end of the evaluation phase to determine the
final scores of the sum of the evaluated factors.
Technical proposals are usually evaluated with
respect to their approach; the organization, personnel, and
facilities of the offeror; and, the general quality and respon-
siveness of the proposal. Cost proposals are supposed to be
evaluated for continuity and realism. Usually, however, cost
proposals are evaluated by what is on the bottom line - the
total cost/price offered. It takes a very unusual contracting
officer/source selection authority to override a low proposal.
When competition is lacking in a particular acquisition (i.e.,
sole source) the Government may send a team to the contractor's
plant to perform a "should cost" study to verify the contractor's
21

proposal estimates. This is very time consuming and expensive,
however, and not often used.
During this evaluation period all proposals are
initially rated as responsive or non-responsive. Certain factors
are rated as critical, and a below minimum score on any one
factor would disqualify the proposal as non-responsive, regard-
less of the total score of the other factors. After all the
responsive proposals have been fully evaluated by the Govern-
ment, a "competitive range" is established. The "competitive
range" is the area of evaluation acceptability within which
proposals must fall to merit subsequent negotiations. DAR
3-805.2 states that:
The competitive range shall be determined on the basis
of price (or cost), technical and other salient factors,
and shall include all proposals which have a reasonable
chance of being selected for award. When there is
doubt as to whether a proposal is within the competi-
tive range, that doubt shall be resolved by including
it.
That final sentence is a result of several Comptroller General
decisions and has made contracting officers very reluctant to
disqualify any proposals. (52:51; 18:60-61)
d. Discussions/Negotiations and Contract Award Phase
This final phase of the source selection process is
the heart of the exercise. After the competitive range is es-
tablished, discussions/negotiations are held with all offerors
in the range. These discussions are for the purpose of advis-
ing each contractor of the deficiencies in his proposal dis-
covered by the Government in the evaluation phase. The offeror
is then allowed the opportunity to correct the deficiencies
22

and amend his proposal accordingly. A "deficiency" is defined
as any part of a proposal which does not satisfy Government re-
quirements. DAR, however, prohibits the disclosure of strengths
or weaknesses in one contractor's proposal to another contractor
("technical transfusion"). "Auctioning" is likewise considered
unacceptable conduct on the part of the Government. DAR 3-805.3
recognizes a very narrow definition of "auctioning" however:
"the action of indicating to an offeror a price which
must be met to stay in consideration; or
the action of informing one offeror that his price is
too low in relation to another offeror."
On the other hand, DAR allows the Government to tell a con-
tractor that his cost proposal is "too high."
Discussions are brought to a conclusion by the an-
nouncement of a common cut-off date for revision of proposals.
The proposal revisions submitted are referred to as "best-and-
final" offers to the Government. Best-and- finals are not neces-
sarily the end of discussions/negotiations, however. The
Government can still make changes in its requirements, i.e.,
alter the scope of the work desired. These changes can actually
be made any time during the source selection process after dis-
tribution of the RFP, even right up to the time for contract
award. If a change is made, all offerors still in the competi-
tion are so advised and given a chance to amend their proposals.
This procedure for changes has been used in the past to allow
for more than one call for best- and- finals
.
After receipt of best - and- final offers (assuming no
changes are made to Government requirements) the agency selects
23

the best contractor, price and other factors considered. The
weight given to price/cost is up to the agency involved. DAR
4-106.5 requires that price not be ignored, however. Indeed
price/cost is usually the controlling factor, and changes made
to best-and- final proposals are seldom in the technical area.
Contractors realize the importance of price, regardless of
Government disclaimers to the contrary, and submit their best
offers accordingly.
After the winning contractor is chosen, the losers
are given a debriefing which is designed to inform them of the
rationale behind the Government's decision. Through the de-
briefing procedure, losing contractors are supposed to be given
information that could enable them to put together a more com-
petitive effort the next time.
2 . Source Selection Problem s
The DOD source selection process has received close
scrutiny both from within and from without for the last twenty
years. Numerous studies have been conducted, articles written,
and books published. The first major work in this period was
the "Harvard Weapons Acquisition Research Project" in 1962.
Many others (though less comprehensive) followed, as the de-
cade of the 1960's initially led by Secretary of Defense
Robert McNamara, seemed to be a period of continual change in
defense procurement. New contract types were tried (cost-plus-
incentive- fee
,
cost-plus - award- fee , fixed-price- incentive) .
Different project management schemes waxed and waned in pop-
ularity (i.e., Total Package Procurement, Life-Cycle Costing,
24

and Multi-Year Procurement) , and defense spending seemed to be
under continual criticism. Major programs experienced cost
and schedule overruns, in addition to performance "underruns,"
the best example being the Air Force "C-5A" project.
All the major acquisition problems of the 1960 's were
not as a result of an inefficient source selection mechanism,
but some certainly were. Subsequently, the RFP was studied
extensively by the Aerospace Industries Association (AIA) in 1969
(1) Public Law 91-129 created the Commission on Government
Procurement (COGP) in November 1969, to survey the state of all
Federal Government procurement policies and procedures and make
recommendations for change. The Commission met for over two and
a half years before issuing their comprehensive report of find-
ings and recommendations in December 1972. (7) Several of the
fifteen "Study Groups" formed by the Commission wrestled specif-
ically with aspects of the source selection process, (8-15)
and many of their conclusions will be cited. The President's
Blue Ribbon Defense Panel reported out in 1970 with Appendix E
dealing directly with the major weapon systems acquisition
process. The National Security Industrial Association (NSIA)
also published their "Defense Acquisition Study" in 1970 giving
an Industry view of the situation. (40) NSIA followed that
in 1973 with a study of the Request for Proposal. (43) The RFP
also received attention in 1973 from the Defense Management
Journal . (19; 38; 59) That same year the Logistics Management
Institute (LMI) published a comprehensive study of the "DOD-
Contractor Relationship," (35) a large part of which was
25

directly related to DOD ' s source selection process. Arming
America , by J. Ronald Fox, was published in 1974 but contained
few original ideas on DOD source selection. (26) It mainly
gathered together many of the papers and articles written pre-
viously.
One result of the many articles, studies, and reports
was an increase in internal agency policy guidance, (44; 45;
87-89; 93-96) capped by the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) Circular A-109 in January 1976. 0MB Circular A-109 pro-
vided a single framework for all federal agency "major systems
acquisitions." The other references clarified policy specific-
ally on DOD major systems, and the source selection procedures
required to implement that DOD policy.
In January 1976, DOD Directive 4105.62 also initiated
a test study of a new method of source selection for major pro-
grams - "Four-Step". (96) The final report and recommendations
of that study were issued in April 1978. (99) Defense Acquisi-
tion Circular Number 76-17 actually implemented Four-Step on
1 October 1978. "Four-Step" is a source selection method for
negotiated procurements which separates the submission of cost
and technical proposals, restricts discussions with offerors
to "clarifications," and limits actual contract negotiations to
a single contractor. Four-Step was developed in the early 1970's
by NASA and subsequently used by the Air Force. Alsq in March
1978 the Senate Governmental Affairs Sub-committee reported out
S.1264 which contains language in the "Competitive Negotiation"
section that would essentially mandate Four-Step procedures for
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all federal agencies. (86:135) S.1264 is the Senate bill,
coauthored by Senators Chiles and Roth, to reorganize and mod-
ernize the Federal Government procurement process and statutes.
A survey was conducted in September 1978 of twenty DOD
prime and subcontractors located in the San Francisco Bay Area
to supplement the above reference history of DOD source selec-
tion problems and studies. Appendix A lists the twenty par-
ticipants in this survey and all personnel interviewed. Ap-
pendix B shows the Questionnaire and structured responses re-
ceived. Most questions asked for responses of (1) strongly
agree, (2) agree, (3) undecided, (4) disagree, (5) strongly
disagree. Others were essay type or yes/no. Later in this
study, the attitudes and opinions of those Industry contract
managers and marketing Vice-Presidents contacted for this sample
will be integrated with the reference history cited above.
Source selection problems were not hard to find. Many
are not new and have proved relatively immune to previous at-
tempts at eradication. A smooth, efficient, and effective DOD
source selection system just does not exist, and never has. A
monopsonistic market environment creates unique problems that
accentuate statutory and procedural shortfalls. For those com-
panies defined as the "Defense Industry" (prime contractors on
major acquisitions), DOD is basically the only buyer among many
sellers. They are playing "the only ball game in town." Con-
tractors virtually fight for survival on major projects. For
the winning contractor the potential is very great, and for the
loser, the penalty is severe. This "all-or-nothing" competition
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is a primary distinction between the defense and commercial
environments. This pressure often leads to contractor "cost
optimism," and subsequent lowering of cost proposals to un-
realistic levels in order to win a major contract. The pressure
is intense. In 1971 Frederic M. Scherer tried to drive home this
point before the Senate Armed Services Committee:
The main mtoivation, overwhelming everything else, is
survival. And in an environment as turbulent as defense-
space contracting was during the 1960 's, the kinds of be-
havior required to maximize one's chances of surviving
are quite different from, and may in some respects conflict
with, close cost control on individual contracts. The
sine qua non of survival for major system suppliers is
winning new development program awards. It was to this,
rather than cost control, that the bulk of top manage-
ment energies was directed. As the number of neiv pro-
grams dwindled, and as the size of individual programs
rose, defense suppliers vied more and more strenuously
for the few new programs available. The pressure to go
along with unrealistic technical specifications requests
of government planners, and indeed to go bevond them,
became irresistible. This built-in unrealism in turn
led to the numerous performance failures and cost over-
runs which have now become all too familiar. The best
talent in contractor technical organizations was put
to work almost continuously participating in source
selection competitions of a highly detailed and pro-
tracted character, but stopping short of the actual
hardware development and testing through which real
technical uncertainties must be resolved. (85:142)
Other problems are attributable to the source selection
procedures themselves. Procedures required by DAR prohibit
"technical transfusion" but encourage "technical leveling."
(92:3-805. 3(a) and (b)) DAR also prohibits "auctioning" per se,
but allows the Government to advise an offeror that his price is
considered "too high." (9 2 : 3- 80 5 . 3 (c) ) DAR discourages "buy-
ins" by name, (92:1-511) but actually invites buy-ins by requir-
ing negotiations with all offerors, which leads to technical
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leveling, (92 : 3-805 . 3(a) ) and subsequent calls for "best-and-
finals" in a monopsonistic price sensitive atmosphere. (92:3-
805.3(d))
Still other problems result from a lack of effective
communications between DOD and Industry. The principal culprit
is the RFP, its contents and the process of its evolution.
That is where the source selection cycle begins, at the "pre-
solicitation" phase.
a. Pre- solicitation Phase
Pre- solicitation problems will be addressed within
the framework established in the earlier description of the
current procedures.
(1) Statement of Work (SOW)
DOD has been criticized repeatedly for failure
to consult with Industry in formulating the SOW. Two of NSIA's
recommendations in 1970 were:
The Department of Defense and Industry should consult
to the maximum extent possible, and well beyond that cur-
rently being accomplished, during the formulation of weapon
system concepts and requirements and prior to contractual
solicitation, in order to bring greater realism to assess-
ment of state-of-the-art, schedules, costs and attendant
risks. (40:12)
The Department of Defense and Industry should review
together work statements and specifications prior to
soliciting bids for development and production of hardware,
so that technical characteristics and performance criteria
defined in requests for proposal on major defense procure-
ments will be practically attainable. (40:29)
In 1973 the National Security Industrial Asso-
ciation (NSIA) repeated that DOD-Contractor dialogue during
the requirements phase gives the customer "... a better basis
for determining what is achievable and what is merely contractor
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boasting, the latter motivated more by the competitive environ-
ment than confidence that the technical objectives can be met."
(43:6)
A negative aspect, however, to early DOD-Con-
tractor dialogue is the very real possibility that performance
parameters might become "tailored" to a specific contractor,
thereby suppressing innovation and possibly reducing eventual
competition. The San Francisco Bay Area firms surveyed over-
whelmingly agreed with this contention. The Commission on
Government Procurement (COGP) also noted this pitfall and the
subsequent possibility for protest to the GAO . (13:404; 15:680)
The Commission felt that the benefits to be gained by closer
cooperation with Industry did not outweigh the disadvantages.
All Bay Area contractors surveyed seemed to have fairly good
relations with their customers and expended considerable mar-
keting effort keeping abreast of their customers' future needs.
Apparently their marketing efforts produced mixed results though.
Several firms complained bitterly about "pre- selection" of others
One electronic test equipment manufacturer commented that some-
times a SOW is written precisely around a competitor's product.
That contractor also disclosed that it was his company's policy
to restrict the Government percentage of its total sales to
only 15%, thus not being dependent on a fickle, non-profit
motivated customer. Of course such a procedure is easier to
implement if the product being sold has commercial applications,
as was the case in that instance. An electronic warfare firm
complained that many RFP's are sent out merely to maintain "the
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appearance of competition." A third contractor, in the tape
recorder field, asserted that there is a great deal of pre-
selection. He did not mind, however, as long as he got his share
Another company, which designs and builds flight simulators for
the Defense Department, said that in his area the Government
does not have the talent required to write good specifications
for a SOW.
Most firms interviewed had negative comments
about the quality of specifications written for Government
RFP's. Twenty-five percent said that there is always something
buried in the specifications that is unrealistic, for instance
a peculiar technical requirement that could boost the price of
the end product unnecessarily by a factor of ten. An example
once given by the President of Boeing Aerospace described an
RFP design requirement for a tape transporter capable of operat-
ing at -65 degrees farenheit. No tape in existence, however,
could hold together below -40 degrees farenheit. (4:25) DOD
Directive 4105.62 seemed to acknowledge this problem and re-
quested contractors to give feedback to an issuing agency so
that the RFP could be amended before the proposal deadline.
Despite the apparent extent of the specification quality prob-
lem, several firms stated that once the SOW goes out, the
Government acts like it were etched in stone and is very reluc-
tant to issue changes.
(2) Evaluation Criteria
The main problem in this area is that DAR 3-501
(b) prevents the disclosure of numerical weights (assigned to
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evaluation factors) in the RFP. Industry has complained as
far back as 1962 that knowledge of the factor weights was es-
sential to giving the Government a proper response to the RFP.
(24:15) A series of Comptroller General decisions in the 1960's
built up a de facto policy which required the Government to tell
Industry what the evaluation factors were (even this was not
always done), and what their "relative weights" were. (24:16-17)
The Industry position was best stated by the NSIA in their 1973
RFP study:
Also, the panel unanimously agrees that an aid to
fully understanding the program objectives would be
to inform the contractors of the weightings. The
weightings are an indication of the relative impor-
tance the customer places on various aspects of the
program. Knowledge of the weightings would indicate
which part of the proposal deserves the most attention.
. . . Hence, in the areas of most importance, the
customer is assured of the contractor's best offer.
Not disclosing the weightings merely rewards the con-
tractor who is the best guesser or the one that has
had the most influence on the requirements or RFP
writers; and contractors in this category are not
necessarily the best assurance of a lowest risk
program. (43:7)
The Government position expressed to Study
Group #6 of the COGP was that the disclosure of precise weights
would result in proposals being ". . . structured in accord with
the Government bias instead of the contractors' own thinking."
The proposals are then evaluated, however, in accord with the
Government bias, not the contractor's. The Government also de-
clared that the disclosure of weights would ". . . stifle innova-
tions by industry and would cause selection 'gaming'." (8:205)
Presumably the Government was saying that its current rules did
not invite "gaming." Nonetheless, Study Group 46 recommended
the disclosure of weights in the RFP. (8:233) Study Group #12
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disagreed, however, and worried that disclosure of weights could
lead to a debate as to the "wisdom" of their specific values.
(15:683, 717) The "wisdom" of the Study Group #12 logic could
also be debated. The Aerospace Industries Association (AIA)
study of the RFP in 1969 concluded that weights should be
disclosed. (1:3) The Defense Management Journal issue on the
RFP in 1973 also recommended disclosure. (38:22) The present
language in S.1264, however, will not change the current DAR
restriction on disclosure. The Senate committee report on
S.1264 asserted that information about the "relative" importance
of weights should be sufficient for contractors to adequately
respond to an RFP, and that the disclosure of actual numerical
weights would permit "gaming." (86:37) To the contrary, the
problem with non-disclosure is that it virtually requires
"gaming," that is guessing what the Government means when it
uses certain descriptive adjectives in relation to evaluation
factors. As a Bay Area electronic warfare contractor pointed
out, giving the ordinal ranking of four evaluation factors can
be very misleading (for example, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th could
be 27%, 26%, 24%, and 23%; or 75%, 10% 8%, and 7%). Recent
Comptroller General decisions, however, have reinforced the
Government's position of non-disclosure. (73; 76; 80; and 84)
Only one Bay Area contractor interviewed agreed
with the Government's policy. A 1978 National Contract Manage -
ment Journal (NCMJ) article by two Government attorneys sided
with the other nineteen contractors in the Industry sample.
The NCMJ story concluded that there is no valid reason for the
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DAR requirement that prohibits disclosure of numerical weights
in the RFP, and that the quality of competition could increase
if weights were listed. (24:23) A Bay Area software supplier
responded that knowledge of weights would allow him to make a
much more intelligent bid/no bid decision before jumping into a
program. Two other firms felt that protests would decrease and
that the integrity of the source selection process would increase
An electronic warfare company reiterated the NSIA position that
their firm would be better able to offer the Government what it
really wanted if it knew what importance the Government had
attached to its evaluation criteria.
Two other potential evaluation factors which con-
tinue to generate controversy are "cost -realism" and "past
performance." Cost-realism is the relationship between a con-
tractor's cost proposal and the Government's cost estimate.
The closer the two figures, the higher the degree of realism.
This factor has been of little interest to Government negotiators
over the years; and according to the Bay Area Industry sample,
it is still being ignored, despite paragraph III.C.2 in DOD
Directive 4105.62. Study Group #12 of the COGP recommended that
the importance of cost per se be de-emphasized, with greater value
placed on an offeror's cost-realism. (9:715) The NSIA likewise
recommended cost-realism be included as a major award factor,
with heavy penalties for a low score, even disqualification
from further consideration. (43:11) Cost-realism will also be
addressed later in the discussion of "buy-ins." A buy-in is
defined as a situation where "cost-realism" is subjugated to its
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antithesis, "cost-optimism," and an unrealistically low cost
proposal is designed to undercut a contractor's competition.
Bay Area suppliers heavily favored a decreased Government em-
phasis on the gross cost factor, especially in the developmental
stages of a project.
"Past performance" is a factor which would seem
to be a potentially valuable contractor motivation tool. The
fact that it is not currently used (even though nominally provided
for in paragraph III.D.l of DOD Directive 4105.62) is puzzling.
Most of the Bay Area contractors sampled felt that past perform-
ance should be ranked second behind technical capability, and
certainly ahead of price. The President of Boeing Aerospace
once declared that: "A general feeling runs through our business
that the 'hurt' from bad performance is only temporary, and good
performance in the past really doesn't help. Now isn't that
strange? One's reputation should be a big selling point. In
the commercial world, without a good reputation, you don't last
long." (4:26) Study Group #12 of the COGP recommended that
past performance be used as a factor in evaluations to provide
an incentive for more efficient supplier performance in the
future. (13:121) The Government experimented with the Con-
tractor Performance Evaluation (CPE) system in the 1960 's but
abandoned it in 1970 as too cumbersome and not worth the time
and effort which had been expended. A new system was proposed
recently within the Air Force to try to revive this motivational
tool, but no results have yet been published. (39:111-118)
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(3) The Request for Proposals (RFP)
According to the Bay Area contractors inter-
viewed, many of the criticisms that have been directed toward
the RFP by past studies still exist today. In 1969 the Aero-
space Industries Association (AIA) basically concluded that
the RFP was not doinc an efficient job. It was too long, too
unwieldy, too vague, of varying quality, used specifications
that were too restrictive or not realistic, and required that
contractor responses contain much more detailed data than was
actually necessary for the source selection decision. The
AIA recommended page limits on both RFP's and contractor pro-
posals, a move designed to force better and more succinct
writing by all parties. The AIA urged that all RFP require-
ments be directly related to the need for selection of the best
contractor in the most efficient manner. Innovation and tech-
nical approach were advocated as factors which deserved greater
emphasis in the RFP. Data requirements which had been charac-
terized as "grossly excessive" and requiring wasteful and costly
contractor effort, were recommended to be closely scrutinized
by the Government and limited to those actually needed for
initial evaluation, not for subsequent negotiations. (1:5)
The President's Blue Ribbon Defense Panel also
lamented that contractor proposals were growing too large (i.e.,
35,000 pages for the winning "C-5A" package, and 5000-5000 for
an average major program (15:598)) and were causing problems
for the Government to properly evaluate. (5:App. E, p. 19)
A call was sounded to reduce the amount of data required by
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Government RFP's. (3:App. E, p. 20) NSIA concurred. (40:28)
Two years later, Study Group #6 of the COGP
also acknowledged the Government's insatiable appetite for
data that it did not need or use. (8:201) One example was
given of a RFP that required a cost breakdown to the ninth
level of the "Work Breakdown Structure" (WBS) . The AIA had
recommended going no further than the third level. (1:3)
Study Group #12 agreed with Study Group #6 and said that going
too far down in the WBS too early merely wastes contractor
effort, because the Government often subsequently changes its
requirements during the source selection process anyway, re-
quiring appropriate changes by the contractors in their
proposals. (15:687)
The January 1973 issue of the Defense Manage -
ment Journal was dedicated to the RFP and echoed all earlier
findings, conclusions, and recommendations. Seemingly little
had changed since the 1969 AIA study. RFP's and proposals
were still too big, of questionable quality, poorly organized,
and required too much early data (38:17, 19, 22) Page limits
again were strongly advised for both RFP's and proposals, with
an example given of the Air Force's "Lightweight Fighter" pro-
gram. (59:14)
The latest RFP study was conducted in 1975 and
published in 1977, but again found little real change. (30:51)
DOD Directive 4105.62, however was revised in 1976 and insti-
tuted several hopeful policy requirements. Agencies are sup-
posed to set up a review board to ensure that all data require-
ments included in the RFP are essential and not too restrictive
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(i.e., "tailored"). Also page limits are now encouraged for
both RFP's and proposals.
In September 1978 most Bay Area firms inter-
viewed had seen little change in the RFP's sent to them. Many
complained about the difficulty in understanding exactly what
the Government wants. An electron tube manufacturer mentioned
one RFP that he had received that had 125 pages, only one of
which told him what was being solicited. An aviation-related
research firm equated reading a Government RFP to wading through
a tax code. That company also complained about the endless
array of add-ons with which the RFP is burdened:
One of these days, the Government must stop its
psychotic submission to the pressure of special in-
terest groups. It borders on the ridiculous, the
way that the size of today's solicitation packages
have grown out of proportion because of the addition
of so many regulations and restrictive provisions.
The Government imposes all too many restrictions
upon the contractor, which are designed to force the
prime contractor to distribute "the goodies." The
contractor is now supposed to be all things to all
people, i.e., OSHA, clean air, the handicapped, the
veteran, minorities, minority enterprises, small
business, women, foreign trade off-sets, buy
American, the subcontracting of certain portions
of the work, etc.
Excess data was also still a problem. As an
armored vehicle supplier pointed out, "data is expensive," to
both the contractor and to the Government. Less than one
fourth of the Bay Area sample thought that the Government did
not ask for too much data. Length of RFP's and proposals
were also local issues, but suppliers were not in agreement
on the remedies. Less than half thought that page limits
should be placed on RFP's, and only slightly over half ad-
vocated limits on proposals, even though most of them
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concurred that longer proposals lead to longer evaluation
periods and to increased costs.
(4) Commerce Business Daily (CBD)
Study Group #6 of the COGP characterized the
CBD as helpful for standard items but not much else, that it
was basically a nuisance and a waste of time, and that ten
days was inadequate notice to potential suppliers. Realistic-
ally, if a contractor were to read about an RFP for the first
time in CBD, his chances for effective competition were des-
cribed as nil. (8:177-179) This was reinforced in a 1975
article in the National Contract Management Journal entitled
"The Games People Play in Source Selection Competitions."
(33:126)
While all Bay Area firms interviewed subscribe
to the CBD, they do not rely on it for news of forthcoming
RFP's. All companies had extensive sales and marketing or-
ganizations directed toward close customer contact, even though
the customers were generally 3000 miles away. As described to
a National Contract Management Association Washington, D.C.
audience, "From an exceedingly practical point of view, the
contractor who is not aware of the RFP he may be about to
receive has fallen down on the job." (37:69) The sentiments
of a Bay Area electronic warfare firm were seconded by almost
all of the others: "If you find out first in the CBD, usually
you are too late, about two years too late." Some of the Bay
Area suppliers said that they mainly use the CBD to measure
the effectiveness of their marketing people, i.e., if they
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not know about an RFP before it comes out in CBD their market-
ing division needs a shakeup.
b. Solicitation Phase
The most critical problem in the solicitation phase
of the major system source selection process is the typically
short turn-around time required by most RFP's, usually thirty
days. The quality and quantity of effort expended by contrac-
tors in this brief period will chiefly determine the selection
of the eventual winner. A secondary solicitation phase prob-
lem deals with the pre-proposal conference. As now conducted
(it is not required, and only used occasionally) it is not
very helpful to the contractors.
(1) Proposal Response Time
Thirty days is rarely enough time to formulate
a competitive proposal on a major system acquisition. Mailing
time subtracts a week. The contractor's bid/no bid decision
must be carefully weighed, proposal team formed, strategy
developed, and technical, management, and cost packages written
in the remaining few days. The short official response time
inhibits more extensive competition. Successful offerors
usually are aware of the forthcoming RFP well in advance.
Study Group #6 of the COGP described the usual thirty day
response time as "inadequate." (8:178) Study Group #12 con-
curred: "We found evidence of undue compression of time.
This occurred in the . . . proposal time allowed. Our inter-
views indicate that the Government has consistently allowed
Industry far too little time to prepare proposals." (15:679)
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"In many cases only those companies who have been working on
their proposals for several months or more - based on their
own estimate of what the RFP may call for - are in a position
to respond." (15:705) As a result, competition is discouraged;
time and money are wasted by contractors trying to do advance
work on less than perfect information; innovation is time-
restricted; and the eventual proposals, coordinated within
companies at great cost and expenditure of overtime manhours
,
will have inevitable errors, complicating the Government's
evaluation task. In fact, with the present practice in nego-
tiated procurements of advising contractors of all deficiencies
in their proposals, much time is lost working out errors ini-
tially caused by the rush to submit proposals within the given
deadline (15:705) The 1973 Defense Management Journal RFP
issue likewise deplored the situation:
Invariably the process of preparing the RFP is a
crash effort and the task of responding is a mountain
mover with all competitors running to get in before
the door is shut.
We need to question the timing of the RFP events
since there is every reason to believe it is not well
founded and that the short fuse typical of the RFP-
proposal cycle may well contribute to the problems
that are associated with the RFP document . . .
A good RFP will certainly be judged to be poor if the
response time is unrealist ically short. (19:11-12)
The recent Bay Area contractor survey under-
scored all that was described by the COGP and the Defense
Management Journal . A chemical propulsion firm responded
that the shorter the time frame for proposal submission, the
greater the risk that the Government will not get what it
wants, or that the best contractor will not win. Their
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company "Manager of Contract Management" continued: "The
greatest problem in Government solicitations is the time pro-
vided for a proper response coupled with the complexity of the
solicitation itself." He also commented that even if you know
about the RFP in advance, you will not have the actual final
requirements until the RFP is issued. Some preliminary work
can be done if you know ahead, but there still is not enough
time to properly finish the rest of the proposal. Some sup-
pliers acknowledged that they are occasionally successful in
getting an extension of time, but not often. This is a crucial
phase in the source selection process (unless the winner has
indeed been pre- selected) . Unfortunately, current Government
policy seems to be illogical and contrary to the goal of ef-
fective competition.
(2) Pre-Proposal Conference
The reference literature is silent on this
area, but it seems to be a Government tool which could be better
utilized. According to Bay Area contractors interviewed, as
now conducted (when employed), pre-proposal conferences are
99% Government evolutions. Contractors come but are reluctant
to ask questions or to volunteer ideas for fear of supplying
intelligence to a competitor. People come just to see if any-
one else will ask a question. No one often does and the Gov-
ernment does not know if the RFP is actually understood or
not. Several companies suggested that individual parties sub-
mit written questions anonymously before the meeting and that
the Government address them with all present. This in fact is
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done by some agencies and helps to clear up areas of conten-
tion without giving anyone an edge.
c. Proposal Evaluation Phase
Most Industry complaints about the proposal evalua-
tion phase have traditionally centered around the scoring exer-
cise. Other comments gathered from the Bay Area survey related
to plant visits and the overall length of the source selection
process once proposals are submitted.
Evaluation has been practiced in many forms. Nu-
merical scoring has been used as an indication of technical
results and seems to be very popular today. Narrative descrip-
tions have also been applied, with or without numbers. Another
method establishes "go/no-go" minimum thresholds on critical
system performance parameters. Most Government agencies use a
combination numerical-narrative hybrid method to document the
subjective views of their proposal evaluators. (13:414) Use of
numerical scoring is often very attractive as the results convey
exactitude, even in subjective areas. A dependence on numbers
can lead, however, to a false sense of security. When an eval-
uation team looks at many subfactors in a top-down process,
even wide differences in ratings for individual elements (some
of which could be critical to performance of the whole system)
tend to be submerged or "averaged out" in the process. Reduc-
tion in the number of elements scored numerically could focus
attention on crucial performance areas. It could give a broad-
er, more visible, perspective to the overall relative tech-
nical merits of each of the competing proposals. The President's
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Blue Ribbon Defense Panel stated that dependence on numbers
creates the risk that good judgment may not be brought to bear,
that an inferior contractor may win because his proposal fits
the particular scoring method being used. (3:App. E, p. 20)
Study Group #12 of the COGP agreed. (13:415) The purpose of
source selection should be to select a contractor, not merely
to choose between competing proposals. Yet the emphasis in
most DOD source selections is overwhelmingly on the evaluation
and scoring of technical proposals. The difference between con-
tractors is seldomly illuminated as well as are the scoring
differences between their proposals.
Bay Area contractors overwhelmingly agreed that
less emphasis should be placed on mathematical equations of
numerical assessments and more on judgment of the overall pro-
posal, its critical points, and the reputation and capability
of the contractor offering the proposal.
Plant visits were another sensitive area with some
suppliers. While most agreed that plant visits should be used
to help evaluate management and technical capabilities, one
responded frankly that plant visits are usually "just big red
carpet jobs" and that the Government gets little chance to
judge actual capabilities.
Several companies complained vehemently about the
length of the evaluation, negotiations, and award phases.
Stories were reported about 18 month and 30 month periods.
Two electronics companies (both 100% DOD business) had similar
situations where a Government representative had promised
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substantial contracts for certain start dates. The firms then
leased additional facilities, hired more people, and waited.
One company finally got the contract 12 months after his cus-
tomer told him that he would, and the other was still waiting
when he was interviewed 18 months after his promised date. The
only contracts which seemed to be immune to long award periods
were end-of
- the-year work placed with a specific Bay Area re-
search facility. When funds have to be obligated, or else will
be returned to the Treasury, DOD can move swiftly in its source
selection decisions.
In general, besides delaying the acquisition of sys-
tems, longer evaluation periods also lead to higher contractor
costs. With inflation at 8-10%, cost proposals cannot remain
fixed over two-year periods. During evaluation and negotiations
the contractor has to keep his proposal team together to answer
Government questions, explain their work, and revise the pro-
posal as required. The longer the team has to stay together,
the more it. costs the contractor, and eventually the Govern-
ment in "Bid and Proposal" costs.
d. Discussions/Negotiations and Contract Award Phase
No other phase of the source selection process has
been subjected to so much abuse and subsequent analysis as
this one. The Government's policy of negotiating essentially
with all offerors simultaneously, apparently has been the root
of many of the problems suffered by major systems programs in
the last fifteen years. The fact that DOD is a "monopsonist ic"
buyer distorts its bargaining position with Industry and com-
pounds the faults inherent in a policy of negotiations with all
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offerors. Candid negotiations are very difficult when conduc-
ted in a monopsonistic environment. There is a very real ten-
dency to tell the Government what the contractor thinks that it
wants to hear. Study Group #6 of the COGP compared this situa-
tion to that of the "... largest and richest lady in town
asking her suitors if they think that she is getting fat. Only
after she has made her selection does she stand a slight chance
of getting an honest answer, (whereupon she may regret her
choice.)" (8:224)
The Defense Department's leverage is very powerful;
either the contractor participates, or he is out of the "game."
The Government has continued to pursue a very shortsighted policy
in this "game," and as a result has experienced serious program
cost overruns, schedule delays, and performance failures. Con-
tractor opinions on this "game" have usually run along the fol-
lowing lines:
We won the competition but they won the contract.
They knew who they wanted and made it come out that way.
We could win a protest but our management doesn't want
our customers mad at us.
There was a Chinese Auction in the best and final and
they lied enough to win it.
This is the only game in town and we must promise
anything to win it.
Promise them anything but be sure you get a CPFF
contract . (53:121)
An address by the President of Sterling Institute
to the NCMA, Washington, D.C. chapter in 1973 concurred:
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All kinds of rigorous exercises are practiced, and
earnestly so, by contractors who feel that the system,
as identified, does not produce an equality among com-
petitors, but has to be massaged and shaped if one would
win.
cleverness is basic to winning.
contract capture rates are, by and large, the func-
tion of an inside track,
do unto others before they do unto you.
regardless of what the RFP may say about award based
on technical competency, if you are not good and low
in price at the same time
,
you can forget it!
exhortations concerning technical competency deter-
minations notwithstanding, it takes a lot of guts to
chuck out a low bidder whom the contracting officer
knows is hungry and needs the work. (37)
In discussions with Bay Area contractors gamesman-
ship was mentioned often, and usually in a derogatory manner.
Simultaneous negotiations with all offerors, then,
has led to technical leveling, technical transfusion, auction-
ing, and buy-ins. (86:39) The first three are direct Govern-
ment actions toward contractors; the last is a contractor action,
but usually Government- induced.
(1) Technical Levelin g
Technical leveling results from discussions
held by the Government with all offerors to identify deficien-
cies in their proposals. (8:219; 33:123) "Deficiency" is a
relative concept, however. To Government negotiators, a
"deficiency" is any aspect of an offeror's proposal which is
not fully responsive to Government requirements. Deficiencies
are identified by the Government and then corrected by the
offeror by making revisions to his proposal. Technical level-
ing tends to minimize innovation and obscure differences in
technical approach of the various competitors by guiding all
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offerors toward the Government's pre-determined design speci-
fications. Technical leveling allows weaker contractors to
remain in competition by helping to upgrade their proposals.
It also encourages hasty changes in all proposals which may
have subsequent negative impacts not foreseeable at the time
of the revisions. '
As proposals become leveled out and their tech-
nical differences narrowed, one other factor takes on greater
and greater importance - cost. Study Group #12 of the COGP
discussed this and concluded that technical leveling leads to
price "shaving" because cost/price is eventually the principal
visible distinguishing factor. (13:437)
GAO has rendered several recent decisions which
have acknowledged technical leveling as legitimate. In Tele -
communications Management Corporation negotiations were held
with two offerors. The evaluation committee concluded that
either firm could adequately accomplish the project. In such
i
situations GAO said that ". . . cost becomes the determinative
factor. Such determination does not mean that there was a change
in the specified evaluation criteria, but merely that the stated
technical criteria failed to act as a discriminator between the
two proposals, and thus price became the deciding factor." (83)
In Dynalectron Corporation the evaluation board changed require-
ments during the course of negotiations so that all six offerors
in the competitive range were judged fully qualified to perform
the required work. The award was then made on the basis of
lowest offered cost. (74) In Charter Medical Services, Inc.
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GAO ruled that price should not become the determinative factor
for award where the RFP indicates that it is of minor importance
unless competing proposals are "essentially equal" technically.
(78) In Bunker Ramo Corporation after the Navy finished its
negotiations and technical evaluation of proposals no offeror
in the competitive range had a "decided technical advantage"
!
over any other offeror. The Navy then concluded that price
was the determinative factor, even though technical had been
assigned 901 of the award formula weight and price only 10%.
GAO concluded that:
Once the proposals were viewed as essentially equal
technically, it was incumbent on the contracting officer
to consider cost . . . This does not mean that the eval-
uation criteria were changed or ignored. In any case where
cost is designated as a relatively unimportant evaluation
factor, it may nevertheless become a determinative factor
when application of the other, more important factors do
not, in the good faith judgments of source selection of-
ficials, clearly delineate a proposal which would be most
advantageous to the Government to accept. (75)
Bay Area contractors acknowledged that leveling
occurs and bitterly complained about the resultant price com-
petition. Several reported that officially performance is
always ranked first in the RFP, but when it comes down to the
selection, price is the difference. Only one firm interviewed
did not mind leveling, but it was insulated by a well-known
brand image for high quality and seldom changed its initial
proposals anyway. That company was in a position to tell the
Government to take it or leave it. Others were resigned to
leveling as being one of the requirements of playing the game.
One stated that even if procedures were changed, some contrac-
tors would still get information leaked from sympathetic
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customers, usually people in the technical section. As a result,
it seemed that all companies had very aggressive intelligence
operations designed to stay competitive in a less than ideal
business environment.
(2) Technical Transfusion
Technical transfusion used to be part of DOD's
source selection operating procedures, but is now prohibited
by DAR 3-805. 3(b). Study Group #12 of the COGP found trans-
fusion common among source selections of the 1960's. (15:707)
The Government imposed transfusion on the prime contractors,
and the primes did it to the subcontractors. Study Group #12
also heard Industry testify that they withheld their best ideas
until the very end of negotiations to avoid having them given
to another offeror. In 1972 GAO ruled that: "Obviously, dis-
closure to other proposers of one proposer's innovative or in-
genious solution is unfair. We agree that such 'transfusion'
should be avoided." (67:622) By 1975, according to a National
Contract Management Journal article, technical transfusion had
disappeared. The 1978 Senate committee report on S.1264 dis-
agreed, however, and laid the blame for current transfusion on
the Government practice of negotiating with all offerors. (86:39)
Several Bay Area firms backed up the S.1264 committee report.
Some said that they had been on both ends of transfusion, but
would rather that it be stopped completely. Most had high
marks for the integrity of Government procurement officials,
but low opinions of many end-user agency technical personnel




Like technical transfusion, auctioning per se
is prohibited by DAR . Also like technical transfusion, de facto
auctioning continues. Again, the root cause is traced back to
the requirement for discussions/negotiations with all offerors.
Study Group #6 of the COGP found in its hearings that discussions
had an undesirable influence on the area of price negotiations.
Successive rounds of discussions as held by DOD were reported
to lead inevitably to price auctions. In Study Group #12 hear-
ings, simultaneous negotiations were characterized as an "exces-
sive use of the Government's bargaining power," and "auction-
ing." As with technical transfusion, while prime contractors
complained about the Government auctioning, subcontractors con-
plained about the primes doing the same with them. [15:717)
Bay Area subcontractors echoed similar sentiments. One said,
"It is an outright blatant auction, nothing less." Most Bay
Area prime contractors admitted conducting "highly competitive
price negotiations" between their suppliers. The degree of
high-handed treatment by a prime seemed to be a function of
his size. The larger he was, the less delicately he treated
his subs.
GAO has held auctioning to be illegal, but on
the other hand has sanctioned multiple "best -and- finals . " In
Neomed, Inc . the low offeror had been identified by the Govern-
ment contracting officer to be a competitor. The GAO said that
this amounted to an auction technique and was strictly prohib-
ited by DAR 3-805.3. (70; 71) This also happened to a Bay Area
communications firm. On a highly complex project with
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considerable uncertainty, the only other competitor came in
with a best-and- final 5% under that of the company interviewed.
According to the company President, there was no way that could
have happened unless his offer had been "leaked" to the other
contractor. In Rockwell International Corporation the GAO
specifically stated that they did not think that a second round
of best- and- finals constituted an unacceptable use of auction
techniques. GAO likewise upheld an agency's call for a second
round of best-and-finals in both Westpac Product Company and
Bunker Ramo Corporation . (72; 75; 77)
Regardless of what DAR and GAO say, most Bay
Area contractors charged that they are auctioned continually
and that they do not like it. Most complain about the best and
final offer concept. A semi-conductor company deplored multiple
cycles of best-and-f inals , but did not mind just one round. An
electronic warfare research company said that it was "... a
real pain to give a best-and- final and then be asked for another."
Other firms did not even agree with one best- and- final . Most
felt that they all negotiate in good faith and then at the end
the Government will respond "Alright, what is really your best
offer?," or "Okay, now who wants this contract the most?" A
chemical propulsion contractor declared: "Return to negotiations
and get off the best-and- final kick!" The quality brand name
company, however, said that they never change their proposal
for a best- and- final , or even for a second best -and- final . An
electron tube supplier thought that the best-and- final was
basically a scare tactic aimed at the company who has to have
the business. A computer software firm "Contracts Manager"
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said "Get rid of it! Don't go through all the b s of
negotiating, then auction at the end." Other contractors just
saw the best-and- final as one more game to play, and another
factor to take into account for a company's overall competitive
strategy (i.e. the best offer is never given until best-and-
finals are called) . The Vice-President and General Manager of
GTE-Sylvania remarked at the 1977 NSIA Navy Acquisition Sym-
posium that:'
. . . bidders are required to submit best and final offers
which frequently result in an auction. Let's face it, bid-
ders usually know clearly the amount of funds the Navy has
for a specific job. And that we won't be candid with the
Navy and give our real assessment of the risks existing
and cost schedules and off-time performance. As a result,
competition tends to hinge on which bidder can most credit-
ably mask the true likely realities of the acquisition out-
come, and the real auction becomes one of auctioning away




"Buying-in" refers to the practice of attempting in
procurement involving price competition to obtain a con-
tract award by knowingly offering a price less than anti-
cipated costs with the expectation of either (i) increas-
ing the contract price during the period of performance
through change orders or other means, or (ii) receiving
future "follow-on" contracts at prices high enough to re-
cover any losses on the original "buy-in" contract. Such
a practice is not favored by the Department of Defense
since its long-term effects may diminish competition and
it may result in poor contract performance. Where there
is reason to believe that "buying-in" has occurred, con-
tracting officers shall assure that amounts thereby ex-
cluded in the development of the original contract price
are not recovered in the pricing of change orders or of
follow-on procurements subject to cost analysis.
DAR, then, does not "prohibit" buy-ins. They
are "not favored," but allowed. GAO has upheld the validity




The third basis for your protest is that Emerson by
submitting "an unreasonably low bid" has violated the
prohibition against "buying-in" as set forth in ASPR 1-311.
You state that the Department of Defense has recognized
that it is undesirable from the Government's standpoint
to permit the practice of buying-in by bidding an un-
reasonably low price with the knowledge that losses may be
incurred in the performance of the contract, but with the
intention of recouping such losses on follow-on procure-
ments; that in most situations, the effect of "buying-in,"
while undesirable to the Government, does not approach the
seriousness of such a practice in this particular procure-
ment; that performance of a contract such as this one
demands a large, experienced staff with unique skills and
abilities; that neither Jeppesen nor any other organiza-
tion could hope to maintain such a staff after termination
of the contract; and it could not reasonably expect to re-
establish such a staff once the organization is disbanded.
You contend that the net result of permitting "buying-
in" in this particular instance would be to destroy the
capabilities which Jeppesen has furnished the Government
during the past years, and to replace them with a new and
novice organization. It is reported that Emerson's bid
price is only 9 percent lower than your firm's bid price
and that there is approximately a 3 percent difference
between Emerson's bid price and the bid price of the next
low bidder, M § T Company. In his report the contracting
officer states that he considers these prices to be highly
competitive rather than an attempt to buy in by Emerson.
We are of the opinion that the prices received on this
procurement are competitive. Even assuming that Emerson
is attempting to "buy in," it is noted that ASPR 1-311 does
not provide for the rejection of a bid for such a violation.
Rather, it provides that where there is reason to believe
that "buying in" has occurred, it shall be the duty of the
contracting officer to insure that any amounts possibly ex-
cluded in the original contract price are not recovered in
the pricing of change orders or of follow-on procurements
subject to cost analysis. In view of the foregoing, we
see no basis for concluding that Emerson's bid should be
rejected because of the alleged attempted "buying-in." (64)
In a separate case GAO concluded:
With reference to your contention that the contract
cannot be fulfilled by Newsom at the price quoted, you are
advised that even where a mistake has been alleged, this
Office has consistently held that a contractor may not be
relieved of its obligation under an otherwise valid bid
for the sole reason that performance will entail a loss
by the contractor. In the present case there is no
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allegation of mistake and the bid price has been verified
as correct. Additionally para. 1-311 of ASPR, titled
"Buying In," recognizes that bids are sometimes knowingly
submitted to a price lower than anticipated costs, but
provides merely that "Where there is reason to believe
that 'buying in' has occurred . . ." (66)
In a more recent 1977 decision GAO again sus-
tained the Government's policy permitting buy- ins. The GAO
ruled in Sencor that the contract award was proper even though
the lowest cost proposal may have been "unrealistic." The RFP
had been issued by the Navy for a one-year level -of -effort
,
cost-plus- fixed- fee (CPFF) contract to provide services and
data systems analysis. After receipt of best-and-f inal offers,
the Navy concluded that the three offerors had submitted tech-
nical proposals which were essentially equal. Therefore, even
though the RFP established technical and management considera-
tions as the most important evaluation factors, with cost as
the least important, the Navy awarded the contract to Techplan
Corporation on the basis of the lowest proposed cost. The
second low offeror challenged the award, alleging that Tech-
plan's proposed cost was not realistic. Since all technical
proposals were found to be essentially equal, GAO held that
price or cost properly should become the determinative factor
in making the award: "Once a procuring agency determines a
particular point spread in technical scores does not indicate
the technical superiority of any one proposal, it is apparent
that the technical evaluation criteria, no matter how heavily
weighted vis-a-vis price, do not provide a meaningful basis
for selection of a contractor."- Also the GAO commented that
just because Techplan's estimate was "well below the Govern-
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ment estimate" it does not mandate a finding of unreasonable-
ness, especially since all four of the best-and-f inal offers
were below the Government's estimate. (81)
The contractor "cost optimism" which typically
characterizes a buy- in is promoted by Government procedures
and attitudes, but it is also a direct function of the amount
of competition present, and of how badly a contractor needs
the business. Penalties for "cost optimism" have seldomly been
severe, and rewards for "cost realism" have seldomly been
adopted.
In an interesting twist, the Peck and Scherer
Harvard Weapons Acquisition Research study accused DOD of "buy-
ing-in" with Congress, i.e., getting a project started with an
unrealistically low cost estimate, the "foot- in- the-door" stat-
egy. Thus DOD has encouraged buy-ins ("cost optimism") to get
"pet" military projects approved that might not otherwise have
been. (23:3; 48:412; 104:56) Study Group #12 of the COGP found
similar circumstances ten years after Peck and Scherer. (15:724)
Peck and Scherer' s answer to buy-ins was "Total Package Pro-
curement" (TPP) , thus a contractor would be locked into costs
for the whole program and could not "get well" on the changes.
TPP, however, only seemed to make a bad situation worse. It
was eventually realized that the high degree of uncertainty
associated with most DOD major weapons system development pro-
jects precluded the kind of accurate predictions of probable




As contended earlier, the Government policy of
simultaneous negotiations with all offerors in a monopsonistic
environment leads to technical leveling, technical transfusion,
and auctioning, with all of the above then culminating in Indus-
try buy-ins. (3:App. E, p. 2; 13:426, 437; 40:4; 86:37; 104:56)
Buy-ins in turn, have led to program cost overruns, schedule
delays, performance failures, and considerable political dif-
ficulty. (48:43) Some buy-ins, however, do not necessarily
result in real trouble. Companies can buy-in to get into a
new area to make themselves subsequently more competitive or to
do research and development that may have later commercial ap-
plications. In these cases of de facto cost -sharing , the con-
tractors make a corporate decision to accept the costs of the
low bid internally. Their motives are different from those sup-
pliers who buy-in with the full intention of making up their
losses at the Government's expense at some future date.
The Bay Area contractor survey found buy- ins
were the order of the day. A rocket motor developer related a
case where he bid $1,000,000 and the winner bid $800,000. The
eventual project cost, however, mushroomed to $1,500,000. A
marine turbine/reduction gear supplier detailed another situa-
tion where a "less capable" company had bought-in on a big con-
tract and had delivered a poor quality product. The Defense
Department then came back and requested the Bay Area supplier
to step in and refit the equipment. The Bay Area firm was
somewhat amused and commented wryly that they "did not lose
any money" on the rework. Several firms hesitated to answer
specific questions on buy-ins, but of the thirteen who did,
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eleven said that they had lost contracts to other contractors
who bought-in, and five admitted to buying-in themselves. Most
characterized buy-ins as prevalent because Government contract-
ing officers are afraid to award contracts to other than the
low offeror, and to the fact that there were no penalties for
unrealistic bids. This had been acknowledged in a 1977 article
by the President of Boeing Aerospace who also admitted to buy-
ing-in "on occasion." (4:26) One Bay Area contractor who de-
clined to answer specifically whether he had ever bought in or
not charged that buy-ins were "too numerous to mention." An
electronic warfare firm complained that everytime, the final
source selection decision comes down to money/cost/price, even
if the winning offer is unrealistic and other factors had been
previously rated higher in the RFP. Another summed up the
general feeling that:
The Government must reevaluate its regulations which
dictate to its procurement agencies the all important need
for competition. Competition is great if it is obtained
realistically. All too often the development of competi-
tion is so uppermost in the Procurement Officer's mind that
he is oblivious to the fact that his new-found competitive
source may be buying in and may not be as efficient as the
old tried and proven sources.
D. RESEARCH QUESTION
What effect will the Four-Step method have on past source
selection system weaknesses such as inadequate RFP's, technical
leveling, technical transfusion, auctioning, and buy-ins? Will




E. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY
Chapter II details the methodology used for background re-
search and for conducting the San Francisco Bay Area contractor
survey. Chapter III outlines the history of Four-Step, includ-
ing recommendations made by the Commission on Government Pro-
curement and the two-year DOD test study, together with its
results. The wording of the proposed Four-Step DAR revision
is presented, followed by a compilation of Industry analyses of
Four-Step weaknesses. Chapter IV is the author's analysis of
the strengths and weaknesses of the main points of the Four-
Step method. Chapter V is a "potpourri" of ideas about Govern-
ment-Industry relations in general, gathered from the Bay Area
contractor survey. To conclude, Chapter VI summarizes the most
critical source selection problems, draws conclusions about the
impact which Four-Step will likely have on them, and makes






This study consisted mainly of a literature review and an
Industry survey. The survey of Government contractors utilized
a structured questionnaire, combined with in-person interviews
of company officials familiar with Government acquisition pro-
cedures .
A. LITERATURE REVIEW
The literature review began with a Defense Logistic Studies
Information Exchange (DLSIE) search of related Defense- sponsored
papers. It widened with an in depth examination of the various
separate Study Group reports of the Commission on Government
Procurement (the actual official four volume "Report of the
Commission on Government Procurement" was not nearly as helpful
as the individiual Study Group reports). Past history was sub-
sequently explored in the Harvard Weapons Acquisition Research
Study, the NSIA Defense Acquisition Study, the AIA Air Force
RFP study, the "Report of the President's Blue Ribbon Defense
Panel," and miscellaneous GAO decisions. Especially valuable
were numerous articles published in the Defense Management
Journal
,
the National Contract Management Journal
,
the National
Contract Management Association Newsletter
,
proceedings from
various annual Sterling Institute "Defense Procurement Executive
Seminars," and papers presented at several recent annual Depart-
ment of Defense sponsored "Acquisition Research Symposiums."
The latter sources proved to be very rich in both innovative
60

new ideas and historical chronicles of past experiences. In-
formation on current procedures and proposed changes was drawn
from the Defense Acquisition Regulations (DAR) , various texts,
and the Government Prime Contracts and Subcontracts Service
,
volumes I- IV, with the accompanying semi-monthly supplements
printed by Procurement Associates.
B. INDUSTRY SURVFY
A survey was made of twenty San Francisco Bay Area Govern-
ment contractors to gather current Industry views on Government
source selection procedures and problems. A wide range of ex-
periences was sought so that answers would not have a pre-
determined look of artificial concensus. Small ($5 million-
$15 million annual Government sales), medium ($15 million-
$50 million), and large (those appearing on the list of the
"Top 100 Defense Department Contractors for 1977") contractors
participated. With such a range of respondents all were not
actually involved in "major weapons systems" acquisitions as
strictly defined by the DOD dollar threshold. Most of those
sampled, however, were primarily involved in negotiated procure-
ments C90 % - 100 % of their Government contracts were negotiated),
with many in the "$10 million+" category. Preliminary inter-
views were done over the telephone. Those were followed up by
questionnaires mailed to the participants, and then by a one
to two hour in-person interview at the contractors' plants.
1 . Questionnaire
An eight page questionnaire (Appendix B) was developed
to obtain sales, purchasing, and Government contract data on
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the companies surveyed, experience information on the actual
personnel responding, and professional views of both marketing
and contract managers regarding present Government source
selection procedures, past source selection problems, and future
changes in Government - Industry relationships which will be
required by S.1264 and the Four-Step method.
2 . Interview
Preliminary half-hour interviews were accomplished by
telephone to set the stage for the questionnaires and later in-
person discussions. The subsequent one to two hour in-person
interviews reviewed material on the questionnaire to make sure
that each respondent fully understood all questions as they
were intended. The interviews then proceeded to expand on what-
ever area the contractor was most anxious about, on the most
pre'ssing problems as he saw them. Several interesting remarks
were noted on subjects not directly related to source selection.
They have been presented in Chapter V to be of possible benefit
for generating ideas for future studies of Government acquisition
issues. Finally, all contractors were assured that their res-
ponses would be held in confidence and only referred to in an
anonymous manner, not identified to specific companies.
C. LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY
Due to the small size of the sample (20), and even smaller
size of the actual questionnaire responses (15), the data gen-
erated by answers to the questionnaire was not intended to be
statistically significant. Also by design, answers solicited
were perceptions and opinions of each of the participants, not
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necessarily official company- approved policy statements.
Nonetheless, the ideas and experiences gathered from the inter-
views and several of the essay-type questions were very valuable
and enlightening. Finally, the study was limited to contractors
in the San Francisco Bay Area because of proximity to the Naval
Postgraduate School in Monterey.
While considerable effort was expended on the Bay Area con-
tractor survey, no time was allotted to contact Defense Depart-
ment personnel familiar with source selection procedures. While
this must be recognized as a limitation, it was pre -designed
.
The conclusions of the study then represent the independent
thought of the author, without pressure or influence from
official Department of Defense policy makers.
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III. DEVELOPMENT OF FOUR-STEP SOURCE SELECTION
A. NASA EXPERIMENTATION
In the late 1960's, in response to Industry critics of
Government negotiated procurement source selection procedures
for Research and rievelopment , NASA, working with the Jet Pro-
pulsion Laboratory, developed a uniquely different approach.
This was first written into official procedures as NASA Pro-
curement Regulation Directive 70-15 of December 1, 1970, and
was designed to steer away from past "auctions." (8:220-221)
The new NASA procedures replaced discussion/identification of
"deficiencies" with "clarifications of offerors' proposals.
"Clarifications" referred to Government efforts to ensure that
(1) each contractor understood the requirements of the solicita-
tion, and that (2) the Government understood what each contractor
was offering in his proposal. "Clarifications" were not to dis-
close what the Government perceived as "deficiencies" in the of-
feror's proposal. Elimination of Technical Leveling and trans-
fusion were also goals of this new procedure. Actual "negotia-
tions" were to be conducted only with the contractor whose
proposal was judged most desirable after initial clarifications.
B. COMMISSION ON GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT EVALUATION OF
NASA PROCEDURES
This new method of source selection was first evaluated
independently by the COGP. Study Group #6 heard Industry rep-
resentatives call for source selection decisions to be made, and
contracts negotiated, on the basis of the best proposal, with
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only the winning contractor. (8:225) Industry further claimed
that the Government could always break off negotiations and
Start with another firm if a stalemate developed. (8:226)
Study Group #6 concluded, however, that no single method would
be appropriate for all situations and that the Government Con-
tracting Officer should select the procedure that best fits
his particular circumstances. (8:232) It was recommended that
the requirement for discussions with all in the competitive
range be deleted from the Armed Services Procurement Act.
Study Group #12 recommended that for major system source selec-
tions, discussions be limited to "clarification of proposals
rather than elimination of deficiencies." (13:441) They be-
lieved that ". . . while competitive optimism could not be elimin-
ated, it would be guarded against ..." and that "... the
excesses of optimism are inevitably generated by multiple
negotiations." Study Group #12 dismissed arguments concerning
possible difficulties in negotiating only with a single con-
tractor at the end as inconsequential. It pointed to the fact
that the Government enters into a great number of sole source
negotiations every year with few unusual problems. (13:442-445)
In other actions supporting the new NASA procedures, Study
Group #12 recommended that the source selection evaluation be
made essentially on the basis of proposals as submitted, en-
couraging innovation, (15:709) and that detailed cost data for
negotiations be required only of the selected source. (15:715)
They added another twist to the NASA procedures by recommending
that technical and cost proposals be separated by a period of
65

time, say 30 days. This would allow additional effort to be
directed toward each evolution. (15:682, 695, 707, 715) The
Aerospace Industries Association (AIA) also endorsed NASA's
procedures. (15:725)
C. GAO EVALUATION OF NASA PROCEDURES
The endorsement which was most critical to the NASA pro-
cedures came on March 31, 1972 when GAO upheld their concept of
"meaningful discussions" as being limited to discussions of
proposal clarifications, vice proposal deficiencies. Basically,
Pratt § Whitney contended that they had lost the contract be-
cause "meaningful discussions" were not held. It was their
opinion that if their "deficiencies" had been identified to
them by the Government, that they could have corrected their
proposal and won. GAO declared that:
The many decisions cited by the parties to this protest,
as well as others dealing with the matter of "discussions,"
were not decided in a vacuum or intended to be merely ab-
stract statements of law. ... In recognition of these
facts, we have not construed the requirement for "written
or oral discussions" as an inflexible, stereotyped mandate
unrelated to the particular procurement involved. Thus,
in many cases we have found that deficiencies had to be
pointed out in order to have meaningful discussions. On
the other hand, in other cases, the facts and circumstances
called for a different conclusion. . . . Obviously, dis-
closure to other proposers of one proposer's innovative or
ingenious solution to a problem is unfair. We agree that
such "transfusion" should be avoided. It is also unfair,
we think, to help one proposer through successive rounds of
discussions to bring his original inadequate proposal up
to the level of other adequate proposals by pointing out
those weaknesses which were the result of his own lack of
diligence, competence, or inventiveness in preparing his
proposal. (79:1000)
In response to Pratt and Whitney's contention that "mean-
ingful discussions" were not held because deficiencies were
not pointed out, GAO emphasized that ". . ., there were, in
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fact, extensive written and oral discussions, some of which
related to areas later judged weak, although they were framed
in the context of clarifications." (67:623) GAO concluded
that:
Therefore, it is our view that whether the statutory
requirement for discussions must include the pointing out
of deficiencies, and the extent thereof, is a matter of
judgment primarily for determination by the procuring ag-
ency in light of all the circumstances of the particular
procurement and the requirement for competitive negotia-
tions, and that such determination is not subject to ques-
tion by our Office unless clearly arbitrary or without a
reasonable basis. ... In view of the foregoing, as more
fully set forth in the decision, we are unable to conclude
that the negotiations did not comport with the statutory
mandate for "written or oral discussions." ( 79 : 1001 ;Z : 623)
In 1974 GAO decided two more cases protesting NASA's lack
of "meaningful discussions." In each, GAO upheld its 1972 rul-
ing that discussions of "weaknesses" inevitably lead to tech-
nical leveling and transfusion, (68:5) and that pointing out
deficiencies unfairly compromises the competitive process by
leveling the "technical disparities" between the weak and the
strong competitors. (69:411)
D. DOD TWO YEAR TEST STUDY
DOD , meanwhile was evidently watching the NASA procedural
developments with anticipation and interest. On October 29,
1975, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Procurement)
issued a memorandum outlining a forthcoming service-wide test
of DOD's application of the NASA source selection procedures,
which DOD now called "Four-Step." The two year test would
gather information to evaluate and assess the effectiveness of
Four-Step. Subsequently on January 6, 1976, DOD Directive
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4105.62 formalized the test which utilized the following pro-
cedures :
In step 1, separate technical proposals are first
solicited and evaluated with limited discussions held with
all offerors. These limited discussions are basically for
the purpose of understanding and clarification and are res-
tricted to proposal meaning, substantiation of technical
approach, solution, or further clarification of the solic-
itation. Technical deficiencies clearly relating to an
offeror's judgment, or his lack of competence or inventive-
ness in preparing his proposals are not disclosed. Cost
estimates which illustrate the impact of tradeoffs upon
projected production and operating and support costs are
required. Fully substantiated cost information pertaining
to performance of the contemplated contract effort is re-
quired in the cost proposal described in step 2.
In step 2, following the technical analysis, and dis-
cussions, a cost/price proposal is obtained from each of-
feror together with any necessary revisions to update
technical proposals, based upon the limited technical dis-
cussions in step 1. Subsequent to the receipt of the cost/
price proposals and any technical revisions made as a result
of these limited discussions, a competitive range is then
established. Those proposals outside of the competitive
range at this point may be eliminated and the offerors so
notified. Meaningful cost/price discussions are then held
with the remaining offerors but are limited to cost realism,
correlation of cost with technical, correction of mathemat-
ical errors of that required to have a complete understand-
ing of what is being offered. The burden of proof for cost
credibility rests with each offeror and supporting data
must provide traceability to the causative technical, busi-
ness or financial conditions that brought about a change.
In order to help identify "Buy-ins," lump sum reductions in
cost/price are not accepted without full and complete sup-
porting rationale. Following such discussions, a proposal
may be eliminated from further consideration and offerors
so notified where the proposal was initially included in
the competitive range because it might have been suscepti-
ble of being made acceptable, or because there was doubt
whether it was in the competitive range and discussions
relating to ambiguities and omissions made clear that the
proposal should not have been included in the competitive
range initially.
In step 3, a common cutoff date for the receipt of
final revisions to technical and cost/price submittals is
then established and the remaining offerors so notified.
Repeated calls for best and final offers without substantive





After receipt of any revised submittals, the proposals
are evaluated based upon the offeror's total proposal and
a single contractor selected for negotiation of the contract.
The selected offeror's proposal must satisfy the Government's
minimum requirements. In order to release proposal teams
at the earliest practical date, all offerors are notified
of the contractor selected.
In step 4, a definitive contract is then negotiated
with the selected offeror and contract award accomplished.
These negotiations must be completed in a timely manner
and must not involve material changes in the Government's
requirements or the contractor's proposal which affect the
basis for source selection. In the event a definitive con-
tract cannot be consummated on a timely basis, negotiations
may be terminated and a new source selection decision made.
Upon request, formal debriefings are provided to unsuccess-
ful offerors after contract award. (99:1-10/11)
DOD wanted to ascertain for itself if Four-Step could el-
iminate technical leveling, technical transfusion, auctioning,
and buy-ins, and ultimately select the contractor who is expec-
ted to do the best overall job. (89:3-122 to 3-126) As planned,
the test would involve six Four-Step programs from each service
and an identical number of control programs run on existing
procedures. Input on results would come from all of the par-
ticipants - each of the DOD services and Industry - plus an
analysis from the Council of Defense and Space Industry Asso-
ciations (CODSIA) representing non-participants who were none-
theless interested in DOD's move toward Four-Step.
In the Spring 1977 issue of the Program Manager's Newsletter
,
the President of Boeing Aerospace reported his company's expe-
riences with DOD's Four-Step test. Boeing had been involved in
four programs where they won one, lost two, and chose not to bid
on a fourth. As might be expected, their views were mixed.




the government team proceeded to detail where it
thought the Boeing costs were out of line. I'll let you
decide for yourself if there was any auctioneering. The
team looked at us across the table and said our price for
this was "substantially high," in another area it was
"significantly high," in another "very high," in another
"very, very high." It also told us which issues were
controversial. I've been to cattle auctions that were
more subtle than that. (4:30)
Boeing did think that the military evaluators were very
careful, though, not to allow any technical leveling, which
was one of the principal aims of Four-Step-
In June 1977 the DOD Four-Step test was outlined at the
6th Annual DOD Procurement Research Symposium by the Chairman
of the Test's Evaluation Group, Lt. Col. Douglas C. Dillon.
He detailed the four areas which DOD was principally concerned
with and their evaluation criteria: (100:239)



















The next month the "Interim Report of the Four-Step Test
Study" was released. On the issue of separate submission of
technical and cost proposals (Steps 1 and 2), 78% of Industry
70

was supportive, but only 50% of DOD. On Step 4, the negotia-
tions with only one contractor, roles were reversed. Only 56%
of Industry was in favor of that, as opposed to 87% of DOD.
DOD said that it had experienced no difficulties in its nego-
tiations with just the winning contractor. Both Government and
Industry seemed to favor a change in procedures to allow earlier
elimination of offerors whose technical proposals were "clearly
unacceptable," (i.e., before submission of cost proposals).
(98:7) At the time of the Interim Report (July 31, 1977) pro-
tests had been submitted on two awards, but GAO had not yet
rendered decisions. In summary, the Interim Report showed that
25% of DOD and 66% of Industry generally favored adoption of
Four-Step for Research and Development projects; that 50% of
DOD and 12% of Industry would rather see Four-Step implemented
as only an optional procedure, not mandatory; that 12.5% of
DOD and 22% of Industry favored some combination or hybrid, of
the old and the new; and that 12.5% of DOD and 0% of Industry
wanted to keep things just as they had been before.
On September 27, 1977, GAO handed down its first decision
on a DOD Four-Step test program protest - Air Research Manufac -
turing Company of Arizona . Since the DOD Four-Step procedures
were almost identical with the NASA procedures, GAO used its
1972 Pratt and Whitney decision as precedent. GAO summarized
and concluded:
The procurement involved here contains similar facts
to the circumstances in B-173677, supra, namely: (1) both
procurements were for research and development; (2) independ-
ent technical approaches to be substantiated by extensive
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data were sought; (3) discussions were in fact conducted
although they did not include the pointing out of de-
ficiencies as such; and (4) many of the protester's weak-
nesses resulted from failure to submit backup data and
were only weaknesses in relation to the contents of other
superior proposals. Reviewing the areas of weaknesses
and deficiencies, we cannot conclude that the failure to
probe the areas resulted in a failure to comply with the
statutory mandate for discussions. Specifically, we can-
not fault the position implicit in the Army's report that
discussions in the areas might have led to an improper
"leveling" of the merit of technical proposals, especially
insofar as relates to design criticisms, which are clearly
within the realm of an offeror's "competence, diligence,
engineering and scientific judgment." (79:1002)
Shortly thereafter, on November 30, 1977, GAO again valida-




At the National Security Industrial Association (NSIA)
sponsored Navy Systems Acquisition Symposium, on 27-28 October
1977, the Vice President and General Manager of GTE-Sylvania
(Communication Svstems Division), Mr. Richard Fidler, critici-
zed Navy (ASPR) source selection procedures. He complained
that they frequently culminated in auctioning, and that GTE-
Sylvania' s experience with the DOD Four-Step test study had
not been encouraging. Mr. Fidler was especially disappointed
that communications between DOD and Industry had been severely
restricted, at least in the test programs. He indicated that
better communications were needed, especially in the pre-solic-
itation phase, if Four-Step would ever succeed. (41:127)
Meanwhile, the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Procure-
ment) had identified several crucial questions regarding the
ultimate effects of Four-Step on the source selection evolution:
Do restrictions prohibiting identification of proposal




Is it, in reality, possible to eliminate all vestiges of
technical levelling; and, should levelling be discouraged
to the extent of frustrating or precluding the Government's
maximizing fulfillment of its technical and operational
requirements ?
Is the practice of buy-in so implicit and so deeply infused
in business practice that changes in proposal evaluation
and source selection methodology can only have a minimal
effect?
Should "four step" source selection replace current pro-
posal evaluation and source selection techniques, or
should it be another means to be employed when and where
appropriate?
Does reduced or truncated competition at the time of
definitive contract negotiations adversely impact the
Government's ability to negotiate favorable terms and
conditions?
Will the "four step" procurement approach result in higher
initial and/or ultimate contract prices? (90:2,3)
On April 1, 1978, the "Final Report" on the DOD Four-Step
test was released. It included background, findings, and
recommendations. As the background of Four-Step has already




Data gathered on each program was inconclusive as to
whether or not the Four-Step method required more time than
conventional procedures. Participants expressed the feeling
in interviews that Four-Step was more time-consuming because
of the sequential submission of technical and cost proposals.
Alternatively, time was saved by negotiating with only one
contractor at the end, vice all. (99:111-3 to 5)
2 Solicitation Quality
There was no appreciable upgrading observed in the
quality of RFP's during the test, according to Industry partic-





Most Government evaluators saw little change in tech-
nical proposal quality. Industry representatives, however,
revealed a marked change in corporate strategy to "first and
best" due to (1) limitations on discussions, (2) early elimina-
tion of offerors, and (3) final negotiations with only a single
contractor. Both DOD and Industry agreed that cost proposals
were improved due to the additional preparation time allowed




Industry claimed that Four-Step required a greater ex-
penditure of resources for the winner, and less for the losers,
than with conventional procedures. It was urged that offerors
whose technical proposals are "clearly unacceptable" be elim-
inated from the competition earlier to save even more money
for the losers. (99 : irr- 11/12)
5 . Single Source Negotiations
DOD evaluators saw nothing but advantages to adopting
Step 4, which requires negotiations with only the winning
offeror. They responded that there was a significant savings
in both time and effort, with no problems encountered during
the test. Government favored the Step 4 procedure 821 to 18%;
Industry favored it 85°o to 15%. (99:111-13 to 15)
6 . Discussion of Deficiencies
Both DOD and Industry agreed (1) that technical leveling
had been greatly reduced; (2) that technical differences had
been more pronounced, making it easier to choose among proposals;
(3) that communications had been severely restricted; (4) but
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that Four-Step was seen as a potentially valuable tool to en-




Cost Estimates and Proposal Decreases
Monitoring in this area showed no evidence of buy-ins
in any of the test programs. It was noted, however, that buy-
ins are also influenced by factors external to source selection
procedures, i.e., the lure of large follow-on production con-
tracts, possible subsequent commercial applications of research
work, or simply the desire of a company to expand into a new
area of business. (99:111-25)
8 Best-and- Final
No multiple best-and- finals were approved by any service
Secretary. It was agreed that the opportunity to call for them
was greatly reduced by moving the required approval up to the
top echelon of DOD management. (99:111-26)
9 Recommendations
It was recommended that Four-Step source selection be
adopted for all competitively negotiated acquisitions above $2
million, involving research and/or development, which have pro-
gressed past concept formulation, with few exceptions allowed.
It was also advocated that discussions of cost proposals not
disclose areas where the Government views a contractor as too
high or too low. Early pre- solicitation dialogue between Gov-
ernment and Industry was viewed as very important to achieving
successful results, (i.e., draft solicitations, draft specifica-
tions, pre- solicitation conferences, and even pre-proposal
conferences). (99:IV-1 to 4)
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Both the Federal Contracts Report (FCR) and the Government
Contracts Service (GCS) reviewed the "Final Report" and suc-
cinctly summarized the results. ( 2 5 ; 46) Four-Step was also dis-
cussed at the Seventh Annual DOD Acquisition Symposium on
31 May-2 June 1978, but no hard opinions on recommendations
emerged from papers presented there. (54; 55)
E. PROPOSED DAR 4-107 "FOUR-STEP" SOURCE SELECTION PROCEDURES
In June 1978, both the FCR and the GCS also published the
proposed DAR coverage on "Four-Step" source selection procedures
with short summaries of Four-Step goals, and requested Industry
comments on the language. (16; 17) In July 1978, both period-
icals subsequently published accounts of several Industry re-
actions to the proposed DAR procedures. (6; 31) CODSIA, while
supportive of the goals of Four-Step, was critical of some of
the written procedures. They recommended (1) elimination of
the series of opportunities for proposal revisions, (2) earlier
expulsion of inferior technical proposals, and (3) increased
restriction on the scope of discussions to ensure only that
the Government understands the proposals. Two other Industry
organizations, the American Defense Preparedness Association
(ADPA) and the Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engi-
neers (IEEE), curiously rejected two basic tenants of the
Four-Step process, namely non-disclosure of proposal deficien-
cies, and the prohibition against Government identification
of a cost proposal as too high or too low. No real reasons
were given for their "status quo" views. (6:A-16) A very ideal-
istic and simplistic appraisal by Dr. Waks of "MITRE" was
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synopsized in the August 28, 1978 issue of FCR. Dr. Waks con-
tended that if the Government wanted to do away with auctions,
leveling, and buy-ins, they should so direct in an internal
regulation, but retain the present procedures. He also declared
that technical transfusion should be promoted, not prohibited.
His reasoning, however, would not have been very popular with
companies contacted for the San Francisco Bay Area survey.
F. DAR 4-107 "FOUR-STEP" IMPLEMENTATION
On October 1, 1978 the Defense Acquisition Circular number
76-17 implemented the final language of DAR 4-107 (APPENDIX C)
.
There were no substantive changes and only a few areas ivhich
were rephrased from the text proposed in July 1978. The only
significant addition was the encouragement of "early and open"
pre-solicitation dialogue in DAR 4-107. 1(c).
G. S.1264 "FEDERAL ACQUISITION ACT OF 1977"
In a parallel development to DOD's test of the Four-Step
source selection method, Senator Lawton Chiles (Dem-Fla)
,
Chairman of the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs , was
holding hearings on his legislation to modernize Federal Gov-
ernment procurement statutes, S. 1264. Working on numerous
recommendations made by the Commission on Government Procure-
ment, Senator Chiles is trying to abolish the Armed Services
Procurement Act of 1947, and Chapter IV of the Federal Prop-
erty and Administrative Services Act of 1949. He wants to re-
place them with a single, modern statute, applicable to all
executive agencies, and designed to stimulate competition and
7"

encourage innovation. The Chiles bill was preceded by a similar
one introduced in 1975 by Senator Percy (Rep- 111). The Percy
bill died in committee without hearings. Senator Chiles' bill
was introduced in early 1976 as S.3005. S.3005 subsequently
died in the 94th Congress but was reintroduced with numerous
modifications as S.1264 in early 1977 to the 95th Congress.
Hearings were held in July 1977 and several revisions made
prior to its ultimate release from committee in February 1978.
S.1264 was subsequently passed by Senator Chiles to the Senate
Armed Services committee for their approval prior to action on
the Senate floor. As the bill did not emerge from the Senate
Armed Services Committee prior to Congress' adjournment in Sept-
ember 1978, it must be reintroduced for action by the the 96th
Congress in 1979.
Title III of S.1264, "Acquisition by Competitive Negotiation,"
is reproduced in Appendix D. Basically it calls for negotiated
acquisitions to follow "Four-Step" procedures in most, but not
all, circumstances. It prohibits ". . . those types of com-
munications between the Government and the offerors which under-
mine the Competitive Process." (86:38) Differentiation is made
between "discussions" and "negotiations." Sole source negotia-
tions are endorsed as the final step in the process, etc.
H. SAN FRANCISCO BAY AREA GOVERNMENT CONTRACTOR SURVEY
Only seven of the twenty firms contacted were familiar
enough with Four-Step procedures to answer that particular
section of the Questionnaire. Of those seven who did respond,
only one was convinced that the best- and- final syndrome would
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disappear, while five thought that multiple best-and- finals
would stop. Four of the seven felt that buy-ins would at least
decrease, but two were unsure. Six of the seven favored a
winnowing of the field after evaluation of technical proposals
and before submission of cost proposals. Only one did not
favor negotiating with just one contractor in Step 4.
In the interviews the loudest objection to Four-Step was
the fear of a loss of, or severe reduction in, communications
between contractors and the Government. Additional complaints
were registered about lengthening an already too long source
selection cycle. Basically, though, most Bay Area contractors
interviewed were just not sure what to think of Four-Step.
Since their views had reinforced the results of most previous
studies done on Industry complaints about Government source
selection procedures, it is anticipated that with subsequent
education and appropriate indoctrination in Four-Step, Bay Area
firms will support its aims and methods.
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IV. ANALYSIS OF PROS AND CONS OF FOUR-STEP SOURCE SELECTION
Each step of the Four-Step process will be examined, and
perceived advantages and disadvantages listed sequentially.







Separate technical proposals are solicited, received,
and evaluated. Limited discussions are conducted with all of-
ferors for the purpose of mutual understanding and clarifica-
tion. During the discussions, technical deficiencies seen by
the Government .in the proposals are not mentioned.
2 Advantages
a. Submission of the technical proposal first should
allow more time to be devoted just to it, with a concomitant
increase in its overall quality. This would counter past
Industry clamor over inadequate RFP response periods.
b. Limiting the scope of discussions of technical pro-
posals by not disclosing deficiencies, will limit the magnitude
of the Government's technical leveling efforts. Limiting tech-
nical leveling will subsequently inhibit Government possibilities
for promotion of technical transfusion and auctioning. This
in turn, will reduce Government sanctioning of contractor
"cost optimism" and accompanying buy- ins. Limiting technical
leveling will also encourage contractor innovation. It will
30

mean that differences in technical proposals will remain sharp
throughout the evaluation process and give the Government
evaluators distinct choices of alternatives in Step 3. Clear
differentiation among technical proposals will enable the
Government to retain price/cost in its appropriate relative
perspective listed in the RFP, and avoid (or reduce the neces-
sity for) "price competition," auctioning, "cost optimism,"
and buy-ins. This is the most crucial area of Four-Step to the
elimination of previous source selection problems. Discussion
of deficiencies in the past has been the ultimate culprit, the
root of all, or at least most all, of the evil.
c. Limiting the scope of discussions should also save
time previously spent in identifying proposal deficiencies.
It also ought to encourage more pre- sol icitat ion Government-
contractor dialogue and better RFP's. The clearer the Govern-
ment's solicitation documents, the higher the quality of the
contractor responses, and the more genuine the competition.
3 . Disadvantages
a. Separating technical and cost proposal submission
and evaluation evolutions will lengthen the time required for
the source selection process, at least in the early stages.
At present, technical and cost packages are submitted and
evaluated simultaneously.
b. Government Contracting Officers might be overly
cautious in applying Four-Step rules limiting the scope of
discussions so that total communications will be unduly
restricted. This could leave all parties frustrated and
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negatively motivated toward the remainder of the Four-Step
process
.
c. Not being allowed to point out deficiencies to
offerors in Step 1 raises the possibility that the Govern-
ment may not get what it wants, and/or, that extensive dis-
cussions of deficiencies may be necessary in Step 4. If the
quality of the typical Government RFP does not improve above





Following the evaluation and discussion of technical
proposals, cost/price proposals are received, together with
any revisions to technical proposals. The competitive range
is then established and those offerors not included are
notified. Limited discussions are then held on the cost pro-




a. Submission of the first cost/price package after
evaluation of technical proposals will save the offerors much
previously wasted effort. Now they can wait to see what re-
visions will be necessary in the technical proposal before
finalizing their cost presentation.
b. Sequential, vice simultaneous submission of the
cost proposal after the technical proposal, will allow more
time to be devoted just to cost parameters. Uncertainties
can be more thoroughly addressed, estimates refined to more
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probable expected values, and the overall quality of the
proposal increased.
c. The limitation on discussions which prohibits
telling an offeror that his proposal is too high or too low
(now permitted by DAR) , will discourage auctioning, which will
in turn restrict Government condoning of buy- ins.
3. Disadvantages
a. Offerors whose technical proposals are unaccept-
able are not eliminated until after submission of cost pro-
posals. This requires unnecessary effort on their part.
b. Step 2 allows for revisions of technical proposals
which have already been revised once. This could lead to




At the completion of discussions a "common cut-off"
date is set for receipt of final revisions to cost and tech-
nical proposals. Evaluations are then conducted on each pro-
posal in total. A single offeror is then selected for negotia-
tion of a contract. Unsuccessful offerors are promptly noti-
fied to allow them to release their proposal teams.
2 . Advantages
The principal advantage inherent in this step is that
the "losers" are notified early and can disband their proposal




Early notification of losers also gives them more time
to lodge a protest before the actual contract is negotiated
with the winner. This could delay the start of the acquisition
project and lengthen the process significantly. Also with
proposals being revised, the "common cut-off" holds the pos-






After selection of the winner, and notification of
the losers, a single contract is negotiated. The negotiations,
however, must not draw out, nor involve substantive changes
in the Government's requirements or the offeror's proposal.
If a contract cannot be consummated in a timely manner, nego-





Negotiating with only the winning contractor saves
Government negotiators considerable time and effort. It also
allows the chosen offeror to be completely frank with the
Government. Subsequent program timetables, performance para-
meters, and cost estimates are thus likely to be more realis-
tic. The integrity of the whole source selection will be




a. In a time- critical situation, negotiating with a
single source in Step 4 may give more leverage to the con-
tractor. Even though the Government could switch to another
offeror, a lack of time may effectively close that option.
The final contract may then cost more than it would under
normal circumstances.
b. The Government may be reluctant to switch to
another contractor, even if time is not critical. A switch
might be interpreted as a sign of weakness or indecisiveness
,
and invite a protest from the originally chosen contractor.
c. The fact that Step 3 designates the winning con-
tractor as basically a "sole source" negotiating partner with




V. GOVERNMENT CONTRACTOR SURVEY MISCELLANY
The San Francisco Bay Area survey to gether contractor
views and ideas on Government source selection problems also
produced several interesting comments on other procurement/
acquisition issues. Those interview comments are related here
(in no particular order) to provide possible topics for future
acquisition research.
A. DCAS
Considerable negative feelings were expressed about the
quality of work accomplished by DCAS field personnel during
their various plant inspections. Stories were told of visits
by DCAS representatives which were made to verify some aspect
of a contractor's operation, but which ended up as nothing
more than "coffee break" conversations. Contractors complained
that most DCAS field people were basically not professionally
qualified to perform the tasks of contract administration for
which they were paid. Out of twenty contractors, not one had
even a small complimentary comment for DCAS' performance. In
discussions with several "intelligence" contractors it was
learned that DCAS was not even "cleared" to administer those
types of contracts. DCAS auditors did not even know when a
company had intelligence contracts in-house.
B. COST-PLUS-AWARD-FEE (CPAF)
Most contractors interviewed were inexperienced in this
type of Government contract. The several who were familiar
3b

with the CPAF felt strongly negative toward it. They resented
the large degree of subjectivity involved in the evaluation
of a contractor's performance. Three companies (in dissimilar
product fields) revealed a corporate policy which precluded
them from negotiating a CPAF contract. One contractor com-
mented that on one past CPAF contract they were so busy keeping
the customer happy that their delivery schedule slipped.
C. SOLE SOURCE CONTRACTING
Many of the survey participants were very involved in sole
source work. Several contractors did almost nothing but sole
source (991 + ) . None of them saw anything wrong or immoral with
that type of business. All of the "99%+" sole source contrac-
tors had heavy investments in particular specialties in the
electronics field, i.e., communications, electronic warfare,
and intelligence. Those firms became very defensive when the
possibility was suggested that the Government could save money
by releasing competitive solicitations vice sole source awards.
Their position was that they were the ones who had developed
the particular expertise and that it would be unfair for the
Government to release their ideas in competitive solicitations.
This was true even in situations where the Government had paid
for the development.
D. COMMERCIAL PURCHASING PRACTICES
Several companies who do most of their business with the
Government (90%+) have adopted Government acquisition procedures
almost verbatum for their own internal purchasing operations.
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They claim that basically, Government procedures are efficient
and effective. They also explained that as long as they are
predominantly a Government contractor, they see advantages in
standardizing their operations with Government techniques,
(i.e., ease of interface).
Not one company interviewed admitted to engaging in the
commercial purchasing practice of "reciprocity." Most stated
that it was strictly not allowed by company policy. Others
responded that they personally did not think that it was sound
business policy.
E. FOREIGN SALES
Several contractors in the communications, electronic war-
fare, and aircraft fields reported a recent marked increase in
direct sales to foreign governments, particularly Middle East-
ern ones. None of the sales, however, were conducted through
DOD ' s Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program. All were strictly
direct sales. A communications company was beginning to sell
more to its foreign clients than to the United States.
F. S.1264
Although all favored Senator Chiles' objectives in S.1264,
most survey respondents were very skeptical about his claim
that the bill would reduce the amount of Government procure-
ment regulations and red tape. They felt that combining all
the Federal directives into just one would not be enough.
Most expected that each agency would continue to issue their
own implementing instructions (i.e., Navy Procurement Direc-
tives), with little reduction in overall volume.

VI. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
A . SUMMARY
The most troublesome negotiated procurement source selec-
tion problems in DOD today are poorly written RFP's, technical
leveling, technical transfusion, auctioning, and buy-ins. All
are impediments to the Government's aim of selecting the best
contractor for a particular project. Within Government, these
problems were acknowledged and first challenged by NASA in 1970
by the development of procedures now referred to as "Four-Step."
The Commission on Government Procurement reviewed the basic
tenants of the procedures (limited discussions, and negotiations
with only one contractor), generally approved of them, and sug-
gested an additional change which would require sequential sub-
mission of technical and cost proposals. GAO first reviewed
the NASA procedures in 1972 and upheld their central theme -
a limited scope of discussions, not identifying deficiencies.
GAO continued this precedent deciding several subsequent pro-
tests in 1974. DOD must have been an interested observer. In
1975, after the second round of decisions by GAO upholding
NASA, DOD prepared an important policy directive titled "Selec-
tion of Contractural Sources for Major Defense Systems." In
that directive (released in early 1976) DOD updated an earlier
version of the same title, and also included a provision which
established a test of DOD ' s "Four-Step" procedures, which were
nearly identical to NASA's. Meanwhile a bill was developing
in the Senate, S.1264, sponsored by Senator Lawton Chiles,
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that would modernize Federal procurement statutes, and among
other things, legitimize the negotiated procurement procedures
now called Four-Step. The "Interim Report" on the DOD Four-
Step test study was released in mid-1977 and revealed generally
favorable results. The "Final Report" came earlier this year
and, although much more detailed than the Interim Report, did
not differ greatly in its findings. It was recommended that
Four-Step be required for nearly all DOD negotiated acquisi-
tions of a Research and Development nature, above a threshold
of $2 million, and advanced beyond the conceptual stage. In
two subsequent protests of awards made on test programs, GAO
upheld its previous positions on the NASA cases and endorsed
DOD's right to utilize Four-Step procedures. On 1 October 1978




The following changes are recommended for implementation
to procedures described in the DAR 4-107 coverage of Four-Step
(APPENDIX C)
.
1 . Identification of Deficiencies
Paragraph DAR 4-107. 5(b) has the potential for "gaming,"
and should be changed. The sixth sentence, "When necessary for
complete understanding of proposals, clarifications and/or
additional substantiating data may be requested concerning
those areas of an offeror's proposal when there is uncertainty
that a deficiency exists" indicates that the Government could
tip off a contractor about certain deficiencies just by asking
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questions in that area and requiring additional data. Identi-
fication of deficiencies in any way should be prohibited and
the above sentence rewritten or removed.
2
.
Earlier Elimination of Unacceptable Proposals
A "technical" competitive range should be established
after discussions in Step 1. Clearly unacceptable technical
proposals should be rejected at this time, prior to submission
of cost packages in Step 2. The additional effort required
for a contractor to submit a cost proposal based on a technical
proposal already judged unacceptable is a waste of his resources
This is already accepted procedure in Step 1 of the "Two-Step"
formal advertised method.
3 Proposal Revisions
Offerors should not be allowed to modify their technical
proposals more than once (between discussions in Step 1 and sub-
mission of cost proposals in Step 2). Present language allows
revisions after discussions in Step 1 and after discussions in
Step 2 (prior to submission for evaluation in Step 5) . Multiple
opportunities for revisions to technical proposals (as opposed
to correction of "mistakes") gives the impression of a potential
for technical leveling. Multiple revisions will not foster a
source selection atmosphere of "first and best."
4 Competitive Rang e
Paragraph DAR 4- 107 . 5 (c) (3) should be amended. The
phrase "(i) when the proposal was initially included in the
competitive range because it might have been susceptible of
being made acceptable," is a holdover from current DAR
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guidance concerning the competitive range and is incompatible
with Four-Step. In Four-Step a proposal should not be initially
included in the competitive range because it might be "suscept-
ible of being made acceptable." In Four-Step a technical pro-
posal cannot be "made" acceptable by subsequent Government
identification of proposal deficiencies as was done previously.
That is prohibited.
5 . Techncial Leveling
The last sentence in paragraph DAR 4- 107 . 5 (e) (7) reads
that there may be situations where ". . . there are no signif-
icant discriminating technical or cost features between two or
more offerors" which would then justify simultaneous negotia-
tions with all in the competitive range. This should be strick-
en. The words appear to invite abuse of the HPA waiver by re-
warding possible technical leveling. If the Four-Step process
is not properly conducted, and leveling does lead to a situation
as hypothesized above, the agency responsible should not be per-
mitted an easy out. Abuse should not be rewarded. Other cir-
cumstances could also lead to a situation where there would be
"no significant discriminating features" (i.e., inadvertent
leveling caused by a particular numerical scoring scheme, or a
situation where competing proposals were very similar from
the beginning), but technical leveling is the most likely causa-
tive factor. The HPA should be the final judge of the situation.




It is unlikely" that any new Government regulation or set of
procedures can completely eliminate all abuses of past acquisi-
tion practices. No regulation can change the fact that DOD is
a monopsonistic buyer. No regulation can realistically elimin-
ate all factors which motivate contractor buy-ins. Four-Step
at least addresses the principal procedural problems. It
changes past regulatory requirements which not only allowed
the abuses, but actually encouraged some of them - leveling,
transfusion, auctioning, and buy-ins.
Use of Four-Step procedures will force more extensive pre-
solicitation Government- Industry dialogue, something urged for
years by contractors. Since discussions are limited, offerors
need to know exactly what the Government wants. It will be in
the Government's interest to promote clear and well-written
RFP's. In the past RFP quality was not really necessary. The
Government could get what it wanted by guiding discussions,
identifying deficiencies, and having contractors revise their
proposals. Government Contracting Officers will probably even
start listing their evaluation weighting schemes in RFP's in a
further attempt to aid understanding of the solicitation by
Industry. The better the RFP, then the better the proposals
will be, and the more effective Four-Step will become.
Strict adherence to Four-Step procedures will eliminate
technical leveling and technical transfusion; it will greatly
reduce auctioning; and buy-ins - since no longer strongly en-
couraged by the Government - will also decrease. Adoption of
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Four-Step by DOD is a sign that Government is indeed serious
about trying to change its image in the acquisition of defense









Products: Communication systems and equipment; electronics
and electronic systems and components; instrumentation systems;
instruments and laboratory equipment; lasers; computers and
components; electromagnetic and magnetic systems and tape;
office machines and equipment; training aids and devices; engi-
neering, research and development; maintenance, repair and
modification services.
Interview: William J. Cassell
Manager, Contract Administration
Data Products Division
Applied Technology Division (Itek Corporation)
645 Almanor Avenue
Sunnyvale, CA
Products: Radar warning systems, power management systems,
military minicomputers, laser intercept systems, acousto-
optical signal processors , optical spectrum analyzers, hybrid
microelectronics liquid crystal displays, radar signal simu-
lators and reconnaissance systems.





Products: Electronic Countermeasures equipment (passive).
Interview: Ms. Cheryl Austin
Manager, Contract Administration
Fairchild Camera § Instrument Corporation
464 Ellis Street
Mountain View, CA
Products: Standard and custom digital integrated circuits,
including MSI and LSI, bipolar memory circuits, linear inte-
grated circuits and integrated microsystems, silicon transis-
tors and diodes, light- emitting diodes, optical arrays, micro-
wave and RF devices, metal-oxide semiconductor devices, direct-
view storage and photomultiplier tubes, audio- visual systems;
aircraft recording and announcing systems; magnetic heads used
for recording, storing and playback; semiconductor test systems,
reconnaissance and mapping cameras, analog- to-digital conver-
ters; specialized radio - frequency systems; precision optics;
aircraft weight and balance systems.
Interview: Mr. J. R. Byrne
Business Development






Products: High power electronics, radar, microwave, and data
communication equipment and computer controlled display ter-
minals .
Interview: Allan Panitch




Products: Radio communications hardware and instrumentation.
Interview: Robert B. Fenwick
President
Dalmo Victor Operations Division (Textron Incorporated)
1515 Industrial Way
Belmont, CA
Products: Electromagnetic defense systems, electro-optics,
and aerospace antennas and displays.
Interview: Eugene Simonalle




Products: Electronics research and development, reconnaissance
systems
.
Interview: Charles E. Price
Manager of Material
FMC Corporation, Ordnance Engineering Division
1107 Coleman Avenue
San Jose, CA
Products: Development and engineering support of specialized
defense material including armored and unarmored military
tracked and wheeled vehicles, amphibious landing vehicles,
hydrofoil craft remote control systems, missile support sys-
tem, armor materials and ocean engineering systems.
Interview: Frank E. Koenig
Assistant Manager, Contract Administration
GTE Sylvania Incorporated (Electronic Systems Group/Western
Division)
100 Ferguson Drive
! Mountain View, CA
Products: Electronic defense systems, reconnaissance, electro-
optics .
Interview: Evan S. Baker






Manager, Proposal Center Operation
Mellonics Systems Development Division (Litton Industries)
1001 West Maude
Sunnyvale, CA







Products: Disc storage subsystems, disc packs, flexible disc
files, data modules, telecommunications, add-on memory and
computer-output-microfilm systems, computer tape, audio and
video tape, word processing products, computer equipment
service
.
Interview: Mr. J. J. Pizzo
Manager, Production Control
Raytheon Company, Semiconductor Division
350 Ellis Street
Mountain View, CA
Products: Transistors, diodes, integrated circuits, special
semiconductor assemblies.
Interview Ms. Sharon Campbell
Manager, Government Contracts
Link Division (The Singer Company)
1077 East Arques Avenue
Sunnyvale, CA
Products: Simulators for aircraft flight and mission; space-
craft; visual simulation; general aviation flight trainers;
simulators for ASW flight and tactics, helicopters, ships,
cockpit procedures, submarines, nuclear power generating sta-
tions; visual simulation, digital data recording svstems, pre-
cision scanning, radar landmass simulation, video data pro-
cessing systems, research and development; visual svstems and
tracked vehicle simulators.
Interview: Mr. J. H. LaBonte
Contract Manager
Advanced Products Operation
Stanford Research Institute, International
335 Ravenswood Avenue
Menlo Park, CA
Products: Basic research on almost any subject.
Interview: Phillip O'Donnell
Manager of Proposals and Special Projects
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United Technologies Corporation, Chemical Systems Division
1050 East Arques Avenue
Sunnyvale, CA
Products: Aircraft engines, rocket motors, airborne systems,
military helicopters, controls and devices.
Interview: Al D. Parker
Manager, Contract Management





Products: Electron tubes and devices, scientific instruments,
vacuum products, digital computers, solid state components.





Products: Electronic devices and related systems and equip-
ment .
Interview: Mr. Lamar Talbot
Manager, Contract Administration
Westinghouse Electric Corporation, Marine Division
Hendy Avenue
Sunnyvale, CA
Products: DD 963 reduction gears, missile launching and hand-
ling for FBM system.
Interview: Larry A. Michael
Materials Manager
Dan H. Bartlett






1501 Page Mill Road
Palo Alto, CA
Products: Electronic and analytical instrumentation, elec-
tronic calculators, solid-state components, digital computers.





SAN FRANCISCO BAY AREA SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE
Information submitted on the following questionnaire is
solely for my own personal use in preparing my Masters thesis
I do not intend to cite specific companies in the thesis, but
rather refer to ideas, opinions complaints, and suggestions
raised by answers to my questions as being from "industry,"
at least as I found it.
The initial questions which deal with company size and
percentage of government/DOD business are raised to give me
a better feel for the setting behind your other responses.
Most questions are "marketing" oriented, but the last group
request information on internal company buying policy that
might need to be passed to the "purchasing" function for com-
pletion. If you are interested, I will be glad to send back
a compilation of all the answers I receive. Your generous
cooperation is sincerely appreciated!
A. General Background .
1. What type of products do you sell to the government?
2. What was your 1977 total sales volume (government and
industry)?
3. How many employees do you have?
Twenty contractors were interviewed, but only fifteen
submitted a completed questionnaire. Of those fifteen, all
did not answer every question, so the total number of res-
ponses are not uniform throughout.
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4. Approximately what percentage of your sales volume is
government?





6. What is your position title?
In the following questions, either fill in the blank, or




SD - Strongly Disagree
B . Requests For Proposals (RFPs )
.
1. How many years experience do you personally have with
government RFPs? Range: 5-25 yrs ; Mean: 15.5 yrs ; Median: 17 yrs
2. Do you subscribe to Commerce Business Daily? Yes - 15
No -
3. The Commerce Business Daily is an effective communica-
tions link between the government and insutry.
SA-1 A-8 U-3 D-2 SD-0
4. 30 days notice in the Commerce Business Daily is
enough time to adequately prepare for the subsequent RFP.
SA-0 A-6 U-2 D-4 SD-5
5. How do you learn about RFPs?
6. A brief (3-5 pg.) Executive Summary would significantly
improve the communication potential of the rest of the RFP.
SA-0 A-6 U-5 D-3 SD-0
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7. The government generally calls for more data than is
necessary to choose the best contractor.
SA-3 A-8 U-0 D-3 SD-0
8. Longer RFPs lead to longer proposals.
SA-3 A-5 U-3 D-3 SD-0
9. Page limits should be placed on RFPs.
SA-1 A-5 U-3 D-3 SD-2
10. Page limits should be placed on proposals.
SA-1 A-8 U-2 D-2 SD-1
11. Longer proposals lead to a longer evaluation period.
SA-2 A-7 U-2 D-4 SD-0
12. Our firm has experienced that a longer evaluation
period leads to increased costs.
SA-6 A-6 U-2 D-l SD-0
If SA/A, why?
13. Standard government "master solicitations" containing
repetitively used terms, conditions, and clauses should be
prepositioned with contractors and not mailed with each RFP.
SA-2 A-9 U-2 D-2 SD-0
14. Management procedures and systems (i.e., management
information systems, configuration management, data manage-
ment, quality assurance program, and facilities data) should
be certified periodically (i.e., annually) by a government
plant inspection, vice submitting, repetitive voluminous pack-
ages of plans with each proposal.
SA-5 A-3 U-2 D-2 SD-2
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15. RFPs usually allow enough time (in relation to the
complexity of the procurement) to respond realistically.
SA-0 A-6 U-l D-6 SD-2
16. RFPs should be sent to only those firms interested and
capable of realistically competing and winning the procurement
(i.e., solicit a competitive number of firms vice a maximum
number)
.
SA-3 A-9 U-0 D-3 SD-0
17. RFPs should include specific evaluation factor weights,
not just relative rankings.
SA-4 A-8 U-2 D-l SD-0
C . Early Government- Contractor Dialogue
.
1. A presol icitation conference (meeting held before RFP
is finalized) would uncover unrealistic requirements being
planned for the RFP.
SA-0 A-9 U-4 D-l SD-0
2. A presolicitation conference would help eliminate sub-
sequent unrealistic contractor proposals.
SA-0 A-10 U-2 D-2 SD-0
3. Presolicitation conferences would add to the clarity
and quality of the RFP, with less subsequent guessing by con-
tractors in their proposals.
SA-1 A-12 U-l D-l SD-0
4. If contractors are allowed to help write the RFP, there
is a real possibility of restrictive specifications in favor
of one contractor or another, or at least such an impression.
SA-1 A-ll U-0 D-3 SD-0
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5. A clearer and more realistic RFP would encourage a
greater number of contractors to participate.
SA-1 A-9 U-4 D-l SD-0
6. Preproposal conferences (meetings held shortly after
mailing of the RFP) would help put each prospective offeror on
equal footing.
SA-1 A-ll U-l D-2 SD-0
D. Source Selection .
1. What factors should the government use in negotiated
source selections? In what order of priority?
2. Source selection for the Full Scale Development (FSD)
phase of the weapons acquisition process should be weighted
more heavily toward management and technical capability than
contractor cost estimates.
SA-2 A-8 U-3 D-0 SD-0
3. Source selection for the Production phase of the weapons
acquisition process should be weighted more heavily toward
management and technical capability than contractor cost
estimates
.
SA-1 A-7 U-4 D-l SD-0
4. If less weight is given to contractor cost estimates
for source selection during the early phases of the weapons
acquisition cycle, buy-ins will decrease (a buy-in being de-
fined as a situation in which a contractor negotiates an initial
unrealistically low cost estimate, with the anticipation of
"getting well" on the changes to follow)
.
SA-3 A-7 U-2 D-0 SD-0
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5. What other procedures could be developed to reduce
buy- ins?
6. From the government's point of view, buy-ins should be
considered undesireable
.
SA-6 A-5 U-2 D-0 SD-0
7. Have you ever lost a contract because you suspect that
someone else bought in? Yes-11 If so, please describe the
situation.
8. Have you ever bought in on a government contract? Yes-
5
9. Plant visits should be made to help evaluate management
and technical capabilities.
SA-4 A-6 U-2 D-2 SD-0
10. Source selection should be more than a mathematical
equation with a limited number of factors and their precise
weights
.
SA-3 A-8 U-2 D-0 SD-0
If SA/A, why?
11. An "inside track" is necessary to win most government
contracts
.
SA-3 A-6 U-2 D-3 SD-0
E . Four-Step Source Selection Method .
If you are familiar with the 4-Step method (whether actual




1. The 4-Step method will encourage "first and best" in-
stead of "best and final" offers.
SA-0 A-l U-3 D-3 SD-0
2. Elimination of multiple "best and finals" will eliminate
auctioning.
SA-0 A-S U-l D-l SD-0
3. Since cost realism is an accepted 4-Step proposal eval-
uation factor, buy-ins will decrease.
SA-0 A-4 U-2 D-l SD-0
4. In step 2, where cost proposals are submitted subsequent
to technical proposals submitted in step 1, procedures should
be changed so that only 3-5 contractors with the best technical
proposals would be requested to submit cost packages.
SA-1 A-5 U-l D-0 SD-0
5. In step 3, where a single contractor is chosen for sub-
sequent negotiations, procedures should be changed so that final
negotiations are held simultaneously with the two best suited
contractors, cost and technical proposals considered.
SA-0 A-l U-3 D-2 SD-1
6. Technical transfusion and technical leveling will be
strongly inhibited by not discussing proposal "deficiencies"
with offerors.
SA-0 A-3 U-4 D-0 SD-0
7. If technical transfusion is reduced, contractors will
be less reluctant to include proprietary data and innovative
ideas in proposals.
SA-0 A-4 U-2 D-0 SD-1
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F. S.1264, Senator Chiles' bill to modernize government
procurement .
1. Use of functional specifications will lead to more in-
novation, competition, and less sole sourcing.
SA-2 A-6 U-3 D-2 SD-0
2. Use of functional specifications, instead of Milspecs,
will save the government money.
SA-3 A-5 U-5 D-0 SD-0
3. Negotiating definitive contracts with all offerors in
the "competitive range" is an unnecessary waste of time and
money for both the government and the offerors.
SA-5 A-5 U-l D-l SD-0
4. Government agencies will be able to circumvent prohibi-
tions against sole sourcing without too much trouble.
SA-2 A-5 U-3 D-5 SD-0
5. Combining all federal government procurement regulations
into one statute will help contractors; save paperwork, time,
and money; and encourage greater competition on government
proj ects
.
SA-1 A-5 U-3 D-4 SD-0
G
.
Internal Contractor Purchasing Policies .
1. How do you obtain competition in your purchase solicit-
ation process?
2. What number of sources do you consider adequate for
competition?
3. Do you usually try to buy from more than one source at
the same time (dual source)?
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4. How many pages to your solicitation packages run?
From to pages, including "boiler plate," specs, etc.
5. How many pages does an average solicitation package
run?
****If possible could you please attach a sample copy of
a "typical" solicitation package to the back of this
questionnaire. It would really be appreciated.
6. What factors do you consider in your source selection
process? In what order of priority?
8. What solicitation techniques do you use, that might be
transferrable to the government, to simplify and expedite your
purchase projects?
9. What types of contracts do you use in commercial
business (%ea)?
a. cost- plus- a-percentage- of -cost
b. cost-plus-a-fixed-fee
c. cost- plus -incentive -fee




H . General Comments .
Please add any additional comments you feel might help
improve the government's solicitation process. Again, thank





DAR 4-107 "FOUR-STEP" SOURCE SELECTION PROCEDURES
4-107 "Four-Step" Source Selection Procedures.
4-107.1 General .
(a) The Four-Step process, briefly described is the
(i) submission and evaluation of the offeror's technical pro-
posal; (ii) submission and evaluation of the offeror's cost
proposal; (iii) establishment of the competitive range and
selection of the apparent successful offeror; and (iv) negotia-
tion of a definitive contract.
(b) The conventional process differs in that (i) of-
feror's technical and cost proposals are submitted and evaluated
simultaneously; (ii) definitive contracts are negotiated with
all offerors in the competitive range; and (iii) the contrac-
tor is selected. One additional difference in the two proces-
ses involves discussion of proposal deficiencies. In the Four-
Step process, deficiencies are not revealed to the individual
offerors, while in the conventional process protracted discus-
sions may evolve around proposal deficiencies.
(c) These procedures are applicable to all competitively
negotiated research and development acquisitions in accordance
with 4-107.2, .3 and .4. They are designed primarily to: focus
attention on technical excellence, maintain the integrity of
each offeror's proposal, provide visibility of discriminating
features between proposals, reduce the opportunity for buy-ins,
preclude the opportunity for the use of auctioning techniques
and assure a disciplined and orderly process in the selection
of sources. To this end, early and open dialogue, e.g., pre-
solicitation notices and conferences, pre-proposal conferences,
informal solicitations and the tailoring of specifications, is
encouraged to establish a better understanding of the Govern-
ment ' s needs
.
(d) Following the technical evaluation and discussions,
cost/price proposals are obtained from each offeror together
with any necessary revisions to update technical proposals.
Subsequent to the receipt of the cost/price proposals and any
technical revisions, a competitive range is established. Those
proposals outside the competitive range are eliminated at this
point and the offerors so notified. Limited discussions are
then held with the remaining offerors on their cost/price pro-
posals and any technical revisions. Following such discussions,
a proposal may be eliminated from further consideration and
the offeror so notified when it is determined to be no longer
in the competitive range.
(e) At the completion of technical and cost/price dis-
cussions, a common cut-off date for the receipt of final re-
visions to technical and cost/price proposals is then estab-
lished and the remaining offerors so notified. An evaluation
is then made of each offeror's total proposal and a single
offeror is normally selected for negotiation of a contract
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(see 4-107 . 5(e) (7) ) . In order to release proposal teams at
the earliest practical date, all offerors are notified of the
contractor selected.
(f) A definitive contract is then negotiated with the
selected offeror and contract award accomplished. These nego-
tiations must be completed in a timely manner and must not in-
volve changes in the Government's requirements or the contrac-
tor's proposal which would affect the basis for source selec-
tion. In the event a definitive contract cannot be awarded
on a timely basis, negotiations may be terminated and a new
source selection decision made.
4-107.2 Applicability . These procedures shall be used
for all competitively negotiated research and development
acquisitions except as provided in 4-107.3 or 4-107.4. They
may, however, be used for any other acquisition when approved
in accordance with Departmental procedures subject to the
restrictions below. Acquisitions for which these procedures
are not used shall follow the procedures of 3-805.
4-107.3 Exceptions and Restrictions .
(a) These procedures are not mandatory for R§D acquisi-
tions which:
(i) involve the exploration or formulation of
design concept(s) as defined in DoDD 5000.1; or
(ii) involve the selection of contractor (s) from
among firms under contract for competitive hard-
ware demonstration, validation, or full-scale
engineering development.
(b) These procedures shall not be used for any acqui-
sitions which:
(i) are negotiated pursuant to DAR 3-202;
(ii) are solely for personal or nonpersonal services;
(iii) are for architect-engineer services; or
(iv) have an estimated value of less than two mil-
lion dollars.
4-107.4 Waiver . Waiver of the requirement for use of these
procedures in the competitive acquisition of defense systems
designated as major pursuant to DoDD 5000.1 shall be granted
only by the Secretary of the Department involved. For all other
acquisitions, waiver shall be granted in accordance with Depart-
mental instructions.
4-107.5 Procedures . Acquisitions subject to this paragraph
shall be conducted in accordance with the following procedures
:
(a) Solicitations . Solicitations shall be developed
in accordance with DAR 3-501 and shall include the following
special requirements and instructions:
(1) A general statement explaining the concept and
procedures to be used in the selection of a contractual source
for the proposed acquisition.
(2) The relative importance of technical/system
performance criteria.
(3) A notification that any proposals which are
unrealistic in terms of technical or schedule commitments or
unrealistically low in cost or price will be deemed reflective
of an inherent lack of technical competence or indicative of
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failure to comprehend the complexity and risks of the proposed
contractual requirements and may be grounds for the rejection
of the proposal.
(4) A schedule of planned source selection events
including, but not limited to, specific dates for the submis-
sion of both technical and cost/price proposals.
(5) Provisions requiring sequential submission of
separate technical and cost/price proposals.
(6) Requirements for the technical proposal to in-
clude, where appropriate, identification of trade-offs among
performance, production costs, operating and support costs,
schedule and logistic support factors; and requirements for
cost estimates which illustrate the impact of these trade-offs.
In addition, requirements for the technical proposal to include
information necessary to indicate that the design to cost and
operating and support cost objectives, when used, would be
achieved when the item(s) enter production.
(7) Requirements for the cost proposal to include
the detailed, substantiating cost information pertaining to
the performance of the contemplated contract and other detailed
data necessary for evaluation of cost factors to be considered
in the source selection decision.
(8) A statement that both technical and cost/price
discussions will be limited as set forth in (b) and (c) below.
(9) A notification that negotiations will be con-
ducted only with the selected offeror, and that offerors should
present their most favorable technical and cost/price proposals
initially.
(b) Step One - Evaluation and Discussion of Technical
Proposals . A detailed evaluation shall be accomplished on all
technical proposals received based upon the established criteria
in the solicitation. Upon completion of the initial evaluation,
limited discussions shall be conducted with all offerors for
the purpose of achieving maximum understanding and clarifica-
tion of the contents of the proposal. During such discussions,
offerors shall not be advised of deficiencies in their pro-
posals. A deficiency is defined as that part of an offeror's
proposal which would not satisfy the Government's requirements.
Offerors shall be advised of areas of their proposal in which
the intent or meaning is unclear or for which additional sub-
stantiating data is required for evaluation. When necessary
for complete understanding of proposals, clarifications and/or
additional substantiating data may be requested concerning
those areas of an offeror's proposal when there is uncertainty
that a deficiency exists. In most cases, clarification of pro-
posals and additional substantiating data, if required, will
be included by offerors with their cost/price proposals and
technical revisions in Step Two. When it is apparent from the
proposals received that the Government's requirements have been
misinterpreted, clarification shall be provided to all offerors
to ensure complete understanding.






(1) Following the technical evaluation and dis-
cussions, complete, fully documented cost/price proposals and
revisions of technical proposals shall be obtained. Each pro-
posal shall be evaluated and those which have no reasonable
chance for award may be eliminated from the competition at this
point and the offerors notified that they are outside the com-
petitive range and will be given no further consideration.
(2) Limited discussions as indicated herein shall
be conducted with all remaining offerors in connection with
their respective cost/price proposals, either on an element-
by-element basis or in their entirety. These discussions may
include (i) rectification and/or correction of inconsistencies
or mathematical errors; (ii) correlation of elements of cost
with their respective technical efforts, in order to assess the
extent of realism in the cost proposal; and (iii) discussion
necessary to ensure a complete understanding of the Govern-
ment's requirements, what is being offered (including delivery
schedules, trade-offs among performance, design-to-cost, life
cycle cost, and logistics support factors) and other contract
terms. An offeror shall not be advised during these discus-
sions that its proposal or any of its elements are either too
high or too low. When discussions of technical proposals are
required they shall be limited as stated in (b) above.
(3) Following such discussions, a proposal may be
eliminated from further consideration and the offeror so noti-
fied (i) when the proposal was initially included in the compe-
titive range because it might have been susceptible of being
made acceptable, or (ii) because there was uncertainty whether
it was in the competitive range, and in either case, through
discussions relating to ambiguities and omissions it becomes
clear that the proposal should not have been included in the
competitive range initially.
(d) Step Three - Common Cut-Off .
(1) A common cut-off date For receipt of technical
and cost/price proposal clarifications or substantiations shall
be established and all participants so notified in accordance
with DAR 3-805.3.
(2) Offerors shall be informed that any changes in-
corporated in the revised proposal must be fully substantiated.
Supporting data must provide traceability to the causative
technical, business, or financial conditions that brought about
any change. Lump sum reductions in cost/price shall not be ac-
cepted without supporting rationale.
(3) After the common cut-off date, requirements
shall not be imposed for additional proposals or revisions to
submitted technical or cost proposals without the prior approval
of an official at a level no lower than that of a Head of a
Procuring Activity (HPA) . Auctioning through repetive calls
for offers is strictly prohibited.
(4) Final detailed negotiations leading to the bi-
lateral execution of a definitive contract shall be deferred





(e) Selection of an Offeror for Final Contract
Negotiations .
(1) Complete evaluation of all factors in accord-
ance with the criteria set forth in the solicitation, includ-
ing cost/fee or price, shall be conducted with careful regard
for security procedures and good business practice.
(2) Based upon the offeror's latest total accept-
able technical and cost proposals, selection of a single source
shall be made for the conduct of final negotiations leading to
a definitive contract. (This does not preclude selecting more
than one source when multiple sources are desired; e.g., com-
petitive prototypes.) Procedures for waiver of this require-
ment are at (7) below.
(3) Proposals unrealistic in terms of technical or
schedule commitments or unrealistically low in cost or price
will be deemed reflective of an inherent lack of technical
competence or indicative of failure to comprehend the complexi-
ty and risks of the contract requirements and may be grounds
for rejection of the proposal.
(4) The selection will be based on an integrated
decision, involving consideration of technical approach, capa-
bility, management, design to cost, operating and support cost
objectives, historical performance, price/cost and other
factors
.
(5) Following selection of the best offeror, all
competitors shall be notified of the source to be awarded the
contract, subject to negotiation of a satisfactory definitive
contract
.
(6) The source selection decision is conditional
in that award of a fully negotiated contract to the selected
offeror must be accomplished within a period of time prescribed
by the selection authority. In the event a definitive contract
cannot be awarded on a timely basis, negotiations may be ter-
minated and a new source selection decision made.
(7) Proposed contracts may be negotiated with two
or more offerors within the competitive range, if the HPA makes
a written determination that a final selection of a single
source should not be made until such proposed contracts have
been negotiated. Such determination shall not be made solely
for the purpose of maintaining a competitive environment. How-
ever, such a determination may be based, for example, on unique
situations where there are no significant discriminating tech-
nical or cost features between two or more offerors.
(f
)
Step Four - Final Negotiations and Contract Award .
Final negotiations leading to bilateral execution of a single
definitive contract will be conducted only with the selected
offeror except when multiple negotiations are authorized by
the HPA. Final negotiations shall include the disclosure and
resolution of all technical deficiencies and all unsubstantiated
areas of cost. Negotiations shall not involve changes in the
Government's requirements or the contractor's proposal which
would affect the basis for source selection. In the event that
such changes are necessary, the procedures in DAR 3-805.4 shall
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be followed. The final negotiated contract must represent a
reasonable probability that the Government's requirements will
be satisfied at a fair and reasonable cost/fee or price.
(g) Debrief ings . Formal debriefings shall be con-




S.1264: TITLE III - ACQUISITION BY COMPETITIVE NEGOTIATION
Criteria for Use
Sec. 301. The competitive negotiation method shall be
used in the acquisition of property and services when -
(1) the anticipated total contract price exceeds the
amount specified in title IV of this Act for use of the
simplified small purchase method; and
(2) the acquisition does not meet the criteria estab-
lished pursuant to section 101(b) or as set forth in sec-
tion 201 of this Act for use of competitive sealed bids.
Solicitations
Sec. 302. (a) Solicitation for offers shall be issued to a
sufficient number of qualified sources so as to obtain effec-
tive competition and shall be publicized in accordance with
section 512 of this Act, with copies of the solicitation to
be provided or made accessible to other interested or potential
sources upon request; however, eligibility to respond to the
solicitation may be restricted to concerns eligible to par-
ticipate in small business set-asides or other such authorized
programs
.
(b)(1) Each solicitation shall include both the evaluation
methodology and the relative importance of all significant
factors to be used during competitive evaluation and for final
selection. In any case, if price is included as a primary or
significant factor, the Government's evaluation shall be based
where appropriate on the total cost to meet the agency need.
(2) Any changes in the evaluation factors or their relative
importance shall be communicated promptly in writing to all
competitors
.
(c) To the maximum extent practicable and consistent with
agency needs, solicitations shall encourage effective competi-
tion by -
(1) setting forth the agency need in functional terms
so as to encourage the application of a variety of tech-
nological approaches and elicit the most promising
competing alternatives,
(2) not prescribing performance characteristics based
on a single approach, and
(3) not prescribing technical approaches or innovations
obtained from any potential competition.
(d) If either the Government or an offeror identifies in-
adequacies in the solicitation which cause misunderstandings
of the agency's needs or requirements, clarification of intent
shall be made to all offerors in a timely fashion and on an
equal basis.
(e) The preparation and use of detailed specifications in
a solicitation shall be subject to prior approval by the agency
head. Such approval shall include written justification to be
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made a part of the official contract file, delineating the
circumstances which preclude the use of functional specifications
and which require the use of detailed product specifications.
Evaluations, Award, and Notifications
Sec. 303. (a) Written or oral diiscussions shall be con-
ducted with all responsible offerors in a competitive range.
Such discussions shall generally be limited to obtaining any
needed clarification, substantiation, or extension of offers.
An initial offer may be accepted without discussion when it is
clear that the agency need would be satisfied on fair and
reasonable terms without such discussions, and the solicita-
tion has advised all offerors that award may be made without
discussions. If discussions are conducted with any offeror,
discussions shall be conducted with all offerors in a compe-
titive range. Discussions shall not disclose the strengths
or weaknesses of competing offerors, or disclose any informa-
tion from an offeror's proposal as a result thereof. Auction
techniques are strictly prohibited. Auction techniques include,
but are not limited to, indicating to an offeror a price which
must be met to obtain further consideration, or informing him
that his price is not low in relation to another offeror, or
making multiple requests for best and final offers. Detailed
negotiations of price and technical factors shall generally be
limited to the successful offeror(s).
(b) When awards are made for alternative approaches
selected on the basis of the factors contained in the solicit-
ation, whether for the basis of the factors contained in the
solicitation, whether for design, development, demonstration,
or delivery, the contractors shall be sustained in competition
to the maximum extent practicable until sufficient test or
evaluation information becomes available to narrow the choice
to a particular product or service.
(c) Until selection is made, information concerning
the award shall not be disclosed to any person not having
source selection responsibilities, except that offerors who
are eliminated from the competition may be informed prior to
awards
.
(d) Award shall be made to one or more responsible
offerors whose proposal(s), as evaluated in accordance with
the terms of the solicitation are most advantageous to the
Government. Notification of award to all unsuccessful offer-
ors shall be made with reasonable promptness.
(e) Notwithstanding any other provision of this fact,
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